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ivWhose responsibility is it to assure food security in an age of globalization? Is improved
governance at the international level our greatest need, or are governance deficits most
severe at the national level? When national governments lag in assuring food security for their
own citizens, can outsiders help make up the resulting governance deficit? What role can
bilateral donors and international financial institutions, such as the World Bank, play?
Is it possible for NGOs to step in to do the job?
These and related pressing questions are addressed in this discussion paper by Robert
Paarlberg. He argues that the problems of hunger and food insecurity urgently require
a national, not global focus. Many national governments in developing countries still do
not provide essential public goods, such as civil peace, rule of law, transport infrastructure,
clean water, electrical power, and public research to generate new agricultural productivity—
essential ingredients in the effort to boost incomes. For tackling hunger, the weak per-
formance of nation-states remains most critical—and in most critical need of improvement.
According to Paarlberg, the governance challenge as far as food security is concerned
is to persuade sovereign governments to provide the necessary public goods that would
ensure access to adequate food.
This paper was commissioned for IFPRI’s 2020 Vision Initiative conference, “Sustainable
Food Security for All by 2020,” held on September 4–6, 2001, in Bonn, Germany. A sum -
mary version was presented at the session on “Whose Responsibility Is It To End Hunger?”
The presentation sparked a long overdue discussion on who are the key actors in the effort
to eliminate hunger, how their role has changed over time, and what their responsibilities are
likely to be in the future. I hope that this paper contributes to continuing this much needed
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viGlobalization is said to be the “key governance
challenge” for the twenty-first century (Reinicke and
Deng 2000, vii). The forces of globalization, which
include the spread of international markets for
goods, services, capital, and labor and the emer -
gence of new institutions and network organiza -
tions that operate easily across borders, are said to
diminish the capacity of sovereign nation-states to
govern their own affairs. According to a report
commissioned for heads of government prior to the
2000 U.N. Millennium Assembly, “One of the chief
characteristics of these globalizing dynamics is that
they overwhelm the attempts of states to manage
globalization alone or control its effects” (Smith and
Naim 2000, 11). 
A conclusion sometimes drawn is that gover -
nance activities must now be shifted to a level above
the nation-state, into the jurisdiction of more cosmo -
politan or global governance institutions (Held
1996). Others argue for a shift in the opposite direc -
tion, moving governance downward in the hope that
“localization” of politics and policy will keep institu -
tions accountable to communities (Hines 2000). 
The need to globalize institutions of governance
has become obvious in some policy areas, such as
international money and finance, climate change,
and even public health. Is the same true in the area
of hunger and food security? This discussion paper
argues that the greatest governance deficits in the
food security area are still at the national level, not
the global level.
Significant hunger persists in some regions
largely because of governance deficits and failures
at the national, not the global level. Too many
national governments in the developing world fail
to provide the essential domestic public goods—
such as peace, rule of law, public research, and
rural transport infrastructure—needed for sustained
growth of farm productivity and rural incomes.
Global governance institutions have at times tried to
step in and fill these national governance deficits in
the developing world. But most such attempts have
ended in frustration since the traditional norm of
state sovereignty continues to stand in the way. The
governance challenge for food security is not so
much to deliver more public goods at the global
level, but instead to persuade existing sovereign
governments to deliver the minimal public goods
needed at the national level.
This argument for the continued centrality of
national government goes somewhat against the
grain of recent opinion. Czech President Vaclav
Havel has forecast that in this new century most
states will evolve into “far simpler, less powerful
administrative units,” while power will move
“upward to regional, transnational and global
organizations.” Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of
State Strobe Talbott sees the same trend: “All coun -
tries are basically social arrangements. [T]hey are
all artificial and temporary. Within the next hundred
years nationhood as we know it will be obsolete; all
states will recognize a single global authority.”
Leaders of intergovernmental institutions often wel -
come and encourage this supposed trend.
Speaking to the General Assembly in 2000,
Secretary-General Kofi Annan asserted that the
institutions of the United Nations ought to be viewed
as having a direct mandate from the peoples of the
earth, rather than a mandate derived from U.N.
member governments (Thiessen 2001, 64). 
Such hopes and expectations of globalized
governance are certainly appropriate and accurate
in some policy areas (for example, trade regulation,
the battle against HIV/AIDS, open-ocean fisheries
protection). Yet in the area of hunger and food secu -
rity it is the performance of separate sovereign
1.  Introduction
1nation-states that remains most critical—and in most
critical need of improvement. 
This paper emphasizes the continuing centrality
of governance at the nation-state level in several
steps. First, it reviews the dominant role that national
governments still play in most food production,
trade, and consumption activities around the world.
Global markets and interstate institutions may be
spreading and proliferating overall, but in the poor -
est countries where large numbers of people are still
hungry, and particularly in the rural regions of those
countries, international food markets and global
institutions still tend to have weak influence relative
to local or national food markets and local or
national food governance institutions.
Second, it offers a concept of adequate gover -
nance for food security based on public goods pro -
vision and asks which institutions are currently
doing the job well and which are doing it poorly. At
the global level a range of international institutions
have now evolved to provide a substantial number
of essential food and agricultural public goods.
Public goods delivery at the national level in some
developing-country regions has been far less ade -
quate, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is not
primarily a global governance deficit that leaves
Africa struggling to improve its food-security per -
formance. Within Africa too many national govern -
ments still fail to provide their citizens with essential
national or local public goods such as civil peace,
rule of law, rural roads, clean water, electrical
power, and public research to generate new agri -
cultural productivity. Improved governance is need -
ed at every level, but these governance failures at
the national level now substantially outweigh gov -
ernance failures at the international level.
A final section of this paper looks at some cur -
rent options for improving the performance of nation -
al governments in countries where hunger remains a
growing problem—again primarily in Africa. It
reviews a number of supporting or gap-filling roles
that governments from the industrial world or inter -
national governance institutions might attempt to
play, and it reviews a range of options available to
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Yet the
conclusion reached is that in regions where hunger
is still a serious problem, national governments on
the scene must take the largest responsibility for solv -
ing the problem. Our fascination with the rapid pace
of globalization and with the rapid evolution of glo-
bal governance institutions in other policy areas
should not distract us from the heavy responsibilities
that traditional national governments continue to
bear in the struggle to end hunger. 
2Traditional nation-state institutions continue to domi -
nate in the area of food supply and food security,
particularly in poor countries where hunger prob -
lems are most acute. This dominance of nation-states
is somewhat surprising, given the proliferation of so
many powerful and influential public and private
institutions both above and below the national level. 
In the public sector, the second half of the twen -
tieth century saw a dramatic increase in the num -
bers of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs)
operating above the level of the nation-state. Some
of these IGOs are regional (for example, the inter -
governmental institutions of the European Union).
But a number are genuinely global institutions (for
example, the universal membership institutions of
the U.N. system). In the private sector, two addi -
tional kinds of institutions have proliferated above
the level of the nation-state: private multinational
corporations (MNCs) and not-for-profit private inter -
national nongovernmental organizations (INGOs). 
This emergence of multiple institutions above
the nation-state dates in the modern era from the
late nineteenth century. It became pronounced after
World War II, and grew into a virtual explosion in
the last two decades of the twentieth century. The
number of intergovernmental institutions recognized
by the Union of International Associations (UIA) in
Brussels nearly tripled during this period, from
1,039 in 1981 to 3,019 by 2001 (Yearbook of Inter-
national Organizations 1981 and 2000/2001).
MNCs have proliferated as well. The number of
multinational business firms in the world’s 14 richest
countries more than tripled, from 7,000 in 1969 to
24,000 in 1994. By 1992 the sales of each of the
top-10 MNCs was more than the gross domestic
product (GDP) of at least 100 nation-states. 
Measured in global terms, in the 1960s and
1970s foreign direct investment (FDI) by MNCs
increased at roughly the same rate as world output
and trade, but then between 1985 and 1995, FDI
increased eight times faster than output and more
than twice as fast as trade (Reinicke 1997). In con -
sequence, the stock of FDI around the world
increased over six times, to reach $3.2 trillion. A
number of developing countries shared in this
growth. In the single decade between 1985 and
1995 annual inflows of FDI into the developing
world increased from $18 billion to $99.7 billion
(Vernon 1998). Private international financial flows
grew even more rapidly than direct investments.
Cross-border equity flows initiated by private firms
increased by 300 percent in the last five years of
the twentieth century, growing from $268 billion in
1995 to an estimated $1.1 trillion by 2000
(Persaud 2001). 
INGOs also increased dramatically in number,
activity, and visibility as the twentieth century
ended. According to one count, the number of
INGOs worldwide grew from fewer than 10,000 in
1978 to more than 40,000 by 1997 (Cusimano
2000). Growth in number and activity of INGOs
was especially strong in the area of international
development. During the 1980s, development assis -
tance transferred through INGOs grew twice as fast
as official development assistance (ODA) trans -
ferred government to government. By the end of the
1980s, some 4,000 development NGOs estab -
lished in the wealthier countries of the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) were disbursing billions of dollars a year
for development, working with 10,000 to 20,000
“southern” NGOs in the developing world, thereby
2.  Dominance of National Governments
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3providing assistance to an estimated 100–250 mil -
lion individuals (UNDP 1993; Clark 1991). 
This late twentieth century increase in the visi -
bility and activity of IGOs, MNCs, and INGOs is
only part of the story. Even as these international
public- and private-sector institutions proliferated,
other new challenges to nation-state authority arose
as well. Private markets expanded, sometimes at
the expense of state-owned enterprise. Under a
combination of political and market pressures,
including pressure from IGOs such as the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
state institutions yielded more economic control
within their borders to private markets and local pri -
vate corporations. Not-for-profit institutions at the
national level also grew stronger and more numer -
ous in developing countries. Within a short space of
time, 10,000 national and community-level NGOs
were established in Bangladesh, 21,000 in the
Philippines, and 27,000 in Chile. Observers have
called this a “global associational revolution” which
could prove “as significant to the late twentieth cen -
tury as the rise of the nation-state was to the late
nineteenth” (Salamon 1994, 109). At the most
local level as well, the traditional institutions of the
nation-state seemed increasingly under challenge.
Local government authorities have demanded
greater control over public revenue and greater
decentralization of government regulation. These
newly invigorated and diverse local institutions
have proven harder for central state institutions to
regulate, and a profusion of grassroots organiza -
tions, including community-based development or
social service organizations have taken their own
initiatives to balance or correct the perceived fail -
ings of the nation-state.
Table 1 maps this expanded institutional ter -
rain, locating traditional nation-state institutions at
the center of what is now a wide range of alterna -
tive institutions capable of challenging the nation-
state for dominance.
This proliferation of institutional alternatives to
the nation-state has visibly weakened the control of
national authorities in many areas of contemporary
political and economic life. Nation-states are finding
it harder to act alone when they seek to govern inter -
national investment and finance, global environ -
mental issues such as climate change, global com -
mons issues such as ocean fisheries, and even public
health issues like HIV/AIDS. Trade, international com -
munications, and hard-to-contain cultural industries
such as entertainment also elude the nation-state’s
grip. Yet traditional nation-state institutions continue to
dominate in the less globalized policy areas of farm -
ing and food security. National political dominance
over farming is conspicuous in the industrial world,
where so many producers work under inducements
provided by lavish national farm subsidy programs.
In poor states as well, the food and farm sector tends
to remain under considerable national political con -
trol. Even in “weak” developing-world states where
national governance institutions lack key resources,
they still tend to be stronger than any alternative insti -
tutions within the food and farm sectors.
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Table 1—Institutional alternatives for governance of food and agriculture, by level
and sector
For-profit Not-for-profit
Level private sector Public sector private sector
International Multinational corporations  Intergovernmental International 
(MNCs) organizations (IGOs) nongovernmental 
organizations (INGOs)
National National corporations National government National nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs)
Local Local private tradespersons Local authorities Grassroots organizations
Source:  Devised by author. For similar classification scheme, see Nye and Donahue 2000.Industrial Countries 
In the affluent industrial world, transnational and
supranational globalization forces are strong, but
traditional national authorities continue to dominate
food and agricultural policy. Food production pat -
terns and practices continue to be shaped by na-
tional agricultural trade restrictions or by national
farm price support and income subsidy policies. In
the case of the European Union, these traditional
farm subsidy and protection policies have been
aggregated into a regional policy. Nonetheless, the
governance institutions of the Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP) remain dominated by a council of
national ministers of agriculture, and ultimately deci -
sions are made through bargaining among the
heads of separate national governments. IGOs
such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the
OECD, and the forum for Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) have repeatedly attempted to
impose restraints on farm subsidy and price support
policies in industrial states, but politically organized
associations of farmers within those states have
exercised enough influence to keep the lucrative
subsidy systems in place.
Consider the relatively weak authority of the
WTO in industrial country agricultural policy. The
industrial country governments that have dominated
multilateral trade negotiations in the WTO have not
yet been willing to subject their national farm sup -
port policies to any significant international disci -
pline. The obligations to reduce farm supports and
limit direct export subsidies that emerged from the
1986–93 Uruguay Round of multilateral trade
negotiations were so weak that they forced neither
the United States nor the European Union to under -
take any reforms beyond those already being con -
sidered for other reasons (such as budget con -
straints). The 1993 Agreement on Agriculture did
require industrial countries to convert nontariff agri -
cultural border protections to tariffs. But even for this
technical change some important exemptions were
made (Japan and South Korea were permitted for
the moment to avoid tariffication obligations for
rice). Moreover, the new tariff bindings were set so
high that in some cases they implied an increase,
not a reduction, in permitted border protection (this
practice came to be called “dirty tariffication”). At
the insistence of the European Union, nations unwill -
ing to allow additional imports were permitted to
bundle together sensitive with less sensitive products
when calculating their compliance with the market
access provisions of the Agreement. The most im-
portant cash income support payments to farmers in
use at the time in both the United States and the
European Union were exempted altogether from
discipline, by placing them in a so-called “blue
box.” A number of other subsidy instruments were
also excluded from discipline, because they were
said to have either minimal market-distorting conse -
quences, such as payments decoupled from market
prices and planting decisions, or a public goods
dimension, such as public research programs and
payments supposedly linked to environmental pro -
tection (Orden, Paarlberg, and Roe 1999).
The financial resources of national governments
in rich countries continue to dominate agricultural
development assistance policy as well, despite the
dramatic increase in IGOs, INGOs, and NGOs
working in this area. NGOs emerged into the field
of international development assistance in the
1980s not so much as challengers to donor state
governments, but as adjuncts. In Norway, for
example, 22 out of 70 INGOs engaged in devel -
opment work obtained more than 80 percent of
their budget from the state, and 39 more were state-
dependent for at least 60 percent of their budget
(Tvedt 1998). Nation-state tax revenues, not private
voluntary contributions, are the major source of
INGO funding in many donor countries including
Sweden (85 percent), Belgium (80 percent), Italy
(77 percent), Canada (70 percent), and the United
States (66 percent) (Smillie and Helmich 1993;
Riddell, Bebbington, and Davis 1995). The recent
NGO revolution in the area of international devel -
opment is therefore not so much a challenge to tra -
ditional nation-state dominance as it is an informal
institutional extension of that dominance.
Developing Countries
Turning to poor countries, here as well food and
farm production systems and development policies
tend to be shaped by national government authori -
5ties. In many cases this large role played by state
institutions is a legacy of colonial rule. The public-
sector export crop production and trade systems set
up by colonizing powers in much of Africa and
Asia did not disappear following independence.
These national commodity production and market -
ing systems, dominated by state-owned corpora -
tions and state monopoly marketing boards, in most
instances, were simply taken over by the newly
independent national government and run for the
purpose of generating state revenue. At times these
developing-country governments taxed the farm sec -
tor so heavily as to impair agricultural productivity.
Maurice Schiff and Alberto Valdes calculate that
between 1960 and 1984 the net effect of direct
and indirect state policy interventions in 18 devel -
oping countries was an enormous income transfer
out of the sector, averaging 46 percent of agricul -
tural GDP per year (Schiff and Valdes 1992). The
newly independent governments of the developing
world may indeed have been weak in some
respects, but not in their ability to extract resources
from their own farmers.
The biggest contrast between rich and poor
countries can usually be seen not in the relative
strength of national food and farm policies, but
rather in the pro-farmer versus antifarmer bias of
those policies. In wealthy industrial countries nation -
al policy has long tended to subsidize farming thus
generating surplus production, whereas in poor
countries governments have more often imposed
explicit or implicit taxes on farming, causing a slow -
down in productivity growth. It is a perverse irony
that governments in rich industrial countries, where
farmers are few in number and already productive,
tend to support investments in farming more than
governments in poor agricultural countries where
hunger persists and productivity is lagging. 
Scholars studying this different policy bias in
rich versus poor countries have been able to link it
statistically to the process of industrial development
itself. When the comparative advantage of the agri -
cultural sector tends to weaken relative to industry,
the “national political marketplace” tends to shift
from supporting an urban-biased policy of taxing
farmers and subsidizing consumers toward a rural-
biased posture of subsidizing farmers at the
expense of consumers and taxpayers. Where the
industrial sector has become most highly advan -
taged relative to agriculture, as in Japan or Europe,
nominal rates of agricultural protection (measured
as the internal-to-border price ratio) tends to be very
high. Where the farming sector has not lost so much
comparative advantage (as in Australia or New
Zealand) nominal rates of farm protection still tend
to be positive in the industrial world, but may actu -
ally be quite low.
1
These differing biases in national agricultural
policy tend to determine not only commodity market
outcomes (surpluses in rich countries versus lagging
production in poor countries) but also rural environ -
mental outcomes. The threat that agriculture pres -
ents to the rural environment can depend on
whether the sector is being taxed or subsidized by
the state. In industrial regions where farmers are
well-organized politically and where national gov -
ernments tend to subsidize farming, the resulting
inducement to boost crop yields often encourages
excessive use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides.
This is one reason why so many farmers in Europe,
North America, and Japan overuse chemical
inputs. The environmental outcome is chemical pol -
lution of surface water and groundwater down -
stream from farms. 
Meanwhile in nonindustrial regions where
national policies impose heavy taxes on farming, a
different kind of environmental damage occurs.
Rather than applying too much chemicals in
response to subsidy incentives, heavily taxed farm -
ers in most poor countries do not use enough inputs
and end up mining soil nutrients, so soil fertility
declines. They may also underinvest in drainage
and irrigation systems, leading to problems of
waterlogging and soil salinity. When yields then
6
1  Those who study this industrial transformation model of policy outcomes have used quantified measures of industrial comparative
advantage within countries to predict 60 to 70 percent of all variation in nominal rates of farm-sector protection across countries
(Honma and Hayami 1986).start to lag the only way to boost production to feed
a growing population is to expand irrigated or
cropped area. This often leads farmers to plow and
irrigate fragile grazing lands, to move onto poorly
suited sloped lands, or to invade forest margins.
The results are accelerating desertification, soil and
forest destruction, and a rapidly shrinking habitat
for native species (Paarlberg 1994).
Developing-country governments have been
under pressure to reduce their interventions in the
food and farm sector. Poor countries that borrow
from international financial institutions such as the
IMF and the World Bank have been told to lift
national controls on internal commodity and input
supply markets, relax restrictions on foreign currency
exchange, privatize state-owned enterprises, and
reduce wasteful employment in state bureaucracies
(including food and agricultural ministries). These
powerful international pressures to weaken the role
of the state over the food and farm sector have been
exercised in part through “structural adjustment”
lending programs and policy reform assistance
projects. Yet many national governments in the
developing world have shown a remarkable ability
to resist such pressures. 
In 1994 the World Bank completed a compre -
hensive study of 29 Sub-Saharan African countries
that had undergone structural adjustment. The study
revealed that 17 of the countries did reduce the
overall tax burden on farming. But some—because
of persistently overvalued exchange rates—actually
increased that burden, and only four of the
29 countries had eliminated parastatal marketing
boards for major export crops. Pressures on gov -
ernments to reform macroeconomic policies pro -
duced somewhat better results, but this study drew
the telling conclusion that “no country [in Africa]
has good macroeconomic policies and good agri -
cultural policies” (World Bank 1994, 1–2; 76–88).
This finding of incomplete reform was reinforced by
the conclusion of an October 2000 IFPRI Food
Policy Report on agricultural market reforms in Sub-
Saharan Africa: 
The pace and extent of reforms have varied widely
across countries and crop subsectors. For the most
part, reforms were not fully implemented. For
example, many governments liberalized internal
trade but maintained a state monopoly over exter -
nal trade. In other instances, although fixed prices
were eliminated, price bands for food crops were
imposed to limit market price fluctuations and pro -
tect consumers and producers from the allegedly
“exploitative” behavior of private traders. State-
owned enterprises remain active in several com -
modity subsectors, notably cotton in West Africa
and maize in Kenya, Malawi, and Zimbabwe.
Many countries reversed reforms as a result of
external shocks or changing economic conditions
(Kherallah et al. 2000, 9).
From the vantage point of the rural poor, the tra -
ditional powers of the nation-state remain surpris -
ingly dominant in most developing countries. State
powers continue to be exercised through a broad
range of public-sector institutions: national or paras -
tatal marketing boards that monopolize the pur -
chase of commodities, national or parastatal seed
and fertilizer companies that monopolize the supply
of key inputs, nationally controlled co-ops and
nationally managed agricultural credit institutions,
national research and extension services, national
commodity import or export authorities, national
irrigation or land-titling agencies, national forest
departments, centralized service delivery agencies
in areas such as health and education, and nation -
ally organized public works projects such as food
for work and public relief. State power is also
exercised in rural areas by local representa-
tives of national ruling party organizations, by
national taxation and revenue authorities, and
of course, by national police and military forces.
Even in supposedly weak states, such national
governance institutions tend to dominate in the
countryside. It is often where such national gover -
nance institutions most dominate that hunger prob -
lems are most severe.
Hunger and National
Dominance
Poorly fed people are found in all regions of the
world. But the greatest concentrations of hungry
people today are in South Asia and Sub-Saharan
Africa. Not coincidentally, traditional state institu -
tions continue to be strong in the food and farm sec -
tors of these two regions, particularly relative to
global institutions.
7South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa stand out
as the only two developing-country regions where
both the incidence and prevalence of human mal -
nutrition remain high and where trends toward
hunger alleviation remain weak. Table 2 presents
region-by-region estimates of levels of chronic mal -
nutrition in the developing world by the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
(FAO). The figures are based on highly aggregated
data so they conceal some important internal and
local differences. Yet only in South Asia and Sub-
Saharan Africa do we still find more than 175 mil -
lion hungry people, combined with a regional
prevalence of malnutrition above 20 percent.
Table 2 reveals a large number of people still
undernourished in East Asia, as might be expected
given the region’s large population and its still
recent movement away from deep poverty. Yet the
clear trend in East Asia is now dramatically away
from hunger. Between 1980 and 1997 the per -
centage of East Asians experiencing undernourish -
ment declined from 29 percent to just 12 percent.
The prevalence of hunger also declined in South
Asia (from 38 percent to 23 percent) and in Sub-
Saharan Africa (from 38 percent to 34 percent). But
even with these declines the prevalence of hunger
remains high in both South Asia and Sub-Saharan
Africa (FAO 2000). Moreover, high rates of popu -
lation growth in these two regions meant that the
total number of hungry inhabitants did not decrease
at all between 1980 and 1997.
Persistent hunger in South Asia and Sub-
Saharan Africa is again visible in parallel estimates
(using different data sources) of child malnutrition
by region in the developing world. As of 1995, the
prevalence of child malnutrition was higher than
30 percent only in South Asia and Sub-Saharan
Africa (Table 3). There was some decline in South
Asia from an extremely high earlier level, but there
was no decline at all in prevalence of hunger
among children in Sub-Saharan Africa.
When considering the actual incidence of child
malnutrition, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa
stand out even more as the two developing-country
regions farthest from solving their hunger problems.
Table 4 shows that South Asia has more than twice
the number of malnourished children as East Asia.
Sub-Saharan Africa has fewer malnourished because
less people reside in the region, but in Sub-Saharan
Africa the absolute number of malnourished children
has recently been rising rather than falling.
This prevalence of hunger and chronic malnutri -
tion in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa cannot
be explained through reference to rapid globaliza -
tion or international governance failures because the
most powerful forces of contemporary globalization
have had only modest impacts on the food and farm -
ing systems of these two regions. Most South Asian
and Sub-Saharan African states have opted to shield
their food and farm sectors from the forces of glob -
alization. Both are postcolonial regions where gov -
ernments remain strongly nationalistic and eager to
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Table 2—FAO estimates of the incidence and prevalence of chronic malnutrition in
developing countries and countries in transition, 1996–98
Undernourished
Region Number of persons Share of population
(millions) (percent)
South Asia 294 23
Sub-Saharan Africa 186 34
East Asia 155 12
Near East and North Africa 36 10
Countries in transition (former USSR, Baltics, East Europe) 26 6
Latin America and Caribbean 55  11
Total 792 18
Source: FAO (2000, Table 1).keep external market influences at bay. National
institutions in these two regions have remained
strong enough, despite globalization, to resist many
IMF and World Bank demands for market-oriented
policy reforms. It is not because the forces of global -
ization have remained ungoverned in South Asia
and Africa that hunger has persisted; strong nation -
al governments in these regions have substantially
resisted the forces of globalization. 
We already noted the power of national gov -
ernments in Africa to resist most IMF demands for
durable liberal market reforms. The consequence of
this resistance has been, for Sub-Saharan Africa, a
growing disconnection from many international
markets, including commodity markets. During the
colonial period African agriculture was deeply inte -
grated into the global commodity markets of that
day, but more recently this deep integration has
weakened. Africa’s volume of exported coffee,
groundnuts, palm oil, and sugar has actually been
shrinking. It was smaller in 1997 than in 1970. 
As with trade, so with international investment.
National policy controls over investment in Africa
are so strict that they help keep most private multi -
national corporate investors away. After gaining
their independence in the 1960s, most African
states embraced tax, regulatory, and trade policies
that proved highly discouraging to new private-
sector FDI. New foreign investment was also dis -
couraged by the failure of some African states to
preserve internal peace, enforce private contracts,
or invest adequately in power, transport, and com -
munications infrastructure. Thus at a time when
MNCs were assuming a larger role in the econ-
omies of developing countries in East Asia and Latin
America, their role in Africa scarcely grew at all.
By 1991–94, when average annual FDI inflows
into the developing world as a whole had reached
$62 billion, total inflows into all of Sub-Saharan
Africa (including South Africa) were still just $447 mil -
lion,  which was then less than 1 percent of the
developing-country total (Cantwell 1997). All of
Sub-Saharan Africa was taking in just $447 million
in FDI annually at a time when China—nominally
still a communist country—was taking in $125 mil -
lion in FDI every day. Also, the scant MNC invest -
ments that did go into Africa almost never went into
the farming sectors of the poorest countries in the
region. Nigeria alone got 44 percent of Africa’s the
FDI total in 1991–94, mostly in its energy sector.
In South Asia as well, national governmental
institutions and policies have tended to keep the
forces of globalization at a distance. In post-
independence India, it was national policy for
roughly four decades to pursue development essen -
tially without foreign MNCs. A labyrinth of national
policies  barred foreign investors from some industries
entirely, restricted them elsewhere to minority owner-
ship, required extensive reviews and official
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Table 3—Prevalence of child malnutrition in developing countries, by region, 1975–95
(percent)
Region 1975 1985 1995
South Asia 67.7 61.1 49.3
Sub-Saharan Africa 31.4 29.9 31.1
East Asia 33.3 26.5 22.9
Near East and North Africa 19.8 15.1 14.6
Latin America and the Caribbean 17.0 10.6 9.5
Source: Smith and Haddad (2000).
Table 4—Incidence of child malnutrition in
developing countries, by region,
1975–95 (millions)
Region 1975 1985 1995
South Asia 90.6 100.1 86.0
Sub-Saharan Africa 18.5 24.1 31.4
East Asia 45.1 42.8 38.2
Near East and North Africa 5.2 5.0 6.3
Latin America and the Caribbean 8.2 5.7 5.2
Source: Smith and Haddad (2000).approvals, placed tight controls on their currency
transactions and distribution practices, and restricted
use of foreign brand names. In consequence, as
late as 1988 the total stock of FDI across all sectors
in India was worth only $1.2 billion. Not until 1991,
when the government of Prime Minister Narasimha
Rao began a number of sweeping investment pol-
icy reforms, did India’s national regulatory grip on
MNC activities at last begin to weaken. 
South Asia’s negligible use of international food
markets is another indicator of its weak connection
to the modern forces of globalization. The poor
countries of South Asia are home to 21 percent of
the world’s population and an even larger share of
those who are still hungry in the developing world
(roughly 38 percent in 1997, according to FAO).
Yet these South Asian countries together take in only
2 percent of the world’s grain imports. The region’s
reluctance to use commercial international grain
markets reflects a conscious policy choice by nation -
al governments to promote “self sufficiency” in food
grains rather than depend on international trade. 
India is again a case in point. India has recent -
ly accounted for roughly 10 percent of total world
agricultural production, but less than 1 percent of
world commodity trade. Some 2.7 million children
die in India every year, 60 percent of them from dis -
eases linked to malnutrition (Sharma 1999), yet
national authorities tightly restrict the movement of
foreign grain into the economy. India does occa -
sionally import small quantities of corn, but it strictly
controls these imports with a tariff rate quota that
places a 60 percent duty on above-quota imports.
The Government of India recently imposed an
80 percent duty on rice to curb the influx of what it
called “cheap grain.” For wheat, India allows
imports only rarely, to offset specific internal trans -
port cost problems (for example, to allow less
expensive imported wheat to reach coastal flour
mills in the southern part of the country). The coun -
try also exports very little wheat, despite its occa -
sionally large internal surplus stocks.
2
Table 5 provides additional evidence of global -
ization’s weak impact in South Asia and Sub-
Saharan Africa. While net private capital flows into
low- and middle-income nations in Europe, Central
Asia, and Latin America were increasing sevenfold to
tenfold from an already substantial level during the
1990s, and while net flows into East Asia (despite the
1997 financial crisis) were more than tripling from an
already high level, private flows into Sub-Saharan
Africa and South Asia increased very little from a low
base. FDI in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa also
increased only slightly from very low levels, while pri -
vate FDI in Latin America, East Asia, Europe, and
Central Asia was exploding upward. 
To summarize, globalization’s impact has been
relatively weak in the two regions of the world where
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2  In 2000, when India’s excess wheat stocks reached 27 million tons, efforts were finally made to clear the stocks through export.
These were frustrated in part by the presence of a wheat crop disease—”Karnal Bunt” fungus—in some parts of India, which has
put India’s wheat on the import ban list of some 30 countries (APBN 2000).
Table 5—Net private capital flows and foreign direct investment into selected low- and
middle-income regions, 1990 and 1998 (millions of dollars)
Region Net Private Capital Flows Foreign  Direct Investment
1990 1998 1990 1998
Sub-Saharan Africa 1,283 3,452 834 4,364
South Asia 2,174 7,581 464 3,659
Middle East and North Africa 369 9,223 2,458 5,054
Europe and Central Asia 7,649 53,342 1,051 24,350
East Asia and Pacific 18,720 67,249 11,135 64,162
Latin America and Caribbean 12,412 126,854 8,188 69,323
Source:World Bank (2000, Table 21, 315).food-security problems remain most conspicuous.
Traditional nation-state institutions remain strong in
these regions, particularly relative to global-age insti -
tutions such as international markets, MNCs, IGOs,
and INGOs. People remain hungry in these regions
not because the traditional power of sovereign states
has been undercut by global markets, but more often
because the powers of traditional nation-states have
not yet been properly used. 
How should the powers of the nation-state be
employed? Here disagreements abound, but for-
tunately the most important function of government is
also the least controversial: to provide basic public
goods such as national defense, social peace, rule
of law, macroeconomic stability, public education,
public health, a public infrastructure for power, trans -
portation, and communication, and research. These
are all goods that societies need to prosper, and
they are goods that the private sector is ill equipped
to provide. Where hunger is worsening today, it is
usually because these basic public goods are not be-
ing provided by still-dominant nation-state institutions.
11The quality of governance institutions can be rated
in many ways. Here we stress a minimal compo-
nent of good governance that enjoys wide accept -
ance. We assume that government’s first task is
to provide the public goods needed by societies
to remain peaceful and prosperous, goods that
are unlikely to be produced in sufficient quan-
tity by private markets alone or by nongovern-
mental institutions.
Defining Public Goods
Economists define public goods as goods with ben -
efits that are available to all (they are “nonexclud -
able”) and which are not diminished in their avail -
ability even when consumed (they are “nonrival” or
“nonsubtractable”). World peace is an example of a
pure public good. It is nonexcludable in the sense
that all can enjoy the consumption of world peace
once it is achieved; and it is nonsubtractable in that
one person’s enjoyment does not reduce the total
amount remaining for others to enjoy. Another ex-
ample of a pure public good is a traffic light. The
safety that traffic lights offer to drivers and pedestri -
ans is available to all who drive or walk on public
streets and sidewalks, so it is nonexcludable. It is
nonsubtractable because the safety offered to one
person does not diminish that provided to others
crossing the same street or to drivers at the intersec -
tion in question (Kaul, Grunberg, and Stern 1999). 
The provision of public goods such as these can
be understood as the first task of government. At the
national level, important public goods would include
adequate national defense, a public infrastructure of
roads, power, and communications, adequate pub -
lic schools and public health services, a monetary
system supplying a common currency of stable value,
and a court system able to enforce laws and con -
tracts and protect life and property. Some of t hese
goods may be partly price-excludable or partly rival -
rous (for example, public schools that charge fees or
public health services with a limited budget), yet all
must be provided primarily by government.
The nature of these goods is such that they are
unlikely to be provided by business firms or private
voluntary associations. Profit-seeking firms lack the
incentive to invest scarce resources in the production
of goods that are nonexcludable, since they cannot
earn profits from goods available to nonpaying cus -
tomers. While private business firms are generally
not suppliers of public goods, they are nonetheless
among the most demanding consumers of such
goods. Private companies usually hesitate to locate
new investments in nations where governments fail
to provide peace, rule of law, or an adequate infra -
structure for power, communications, and transport. 
Voluntary agencies that do not work for profit
(including NGOs) are often motivated to produce
some nonexcludable public goods. But seldom will
they have sufficient resources or authority to do so
on their own. NGOs do many good things, but they
do not build national power grids and trunk roads,
create criminal justice systems (police, courts, pris -
ons) to protect life and property, or establish the lab -
oratories needed to carry out basic scientific and
medical research. Public governmental institutions
have traditionally held the role of provider of these
more expensive public goods. Governmental insti -
tutions are more likely to have the financial means
to provide such goods within their jurisdictions
because of their exclusive sovereign right to raise
revenues through taxation. Governments will also
have an incentive to spend public revenues for pub -
lic goods, because only through the increasing
prosperity of their domestic societies (made possible
through public goods provision) will their tax base
12
3.  Public Goods Provision by Governmentand hence their own revenue grow in the long run.
Theorists of political economy argue that even non -
democratic governments thus have an incentive to
use revenues to provide public goods, in order to




Provision of essential public goods is, admittedly,
only the first task of good government. A more
ambitious vision based on an expanded view of
economic or social justice would have to include
provision of some nonpublic (subtractable or exclud -
able)  goods as well. In the area of food security,
one such good might be a supply of cheap food
made available to the poor through a public food-
distribution system. In other cases the pursuit of food
security might even require that private goods (such
as land) be taken from a traditionally privileged cat -
egory of citizens, with or without compensation, for
redistribution to disadvantaged citizens. In still other
cases food security might require government
action to reduce racial prejudice or gender inequity.
These are important tasks in some cases, and a
more complete review of governance would have
to address them. Yet public goods delivery is an
essential task in all cases. 
The public goods definition used here stops
short of requiring governments to provide essential
public goods through one particular kind of gov -
ernmental system, for example, a democratic rather
than an authoritarian system. There is evidence that
democracies are more likely than authoritarian sys -
tems to provide essential public goods related to
food security due to their institutionalization of
social accountability through regularly scheduled
competitive elections under the scrutiny of a free
press (Sen 1985). Yet the statistical link between
democratization and hunger reduction is simply not
strong enough to focus on this characteristic of gov -
ernance alone. Of the several independent vari -
ables offered and examined by Smith and Haddad
in a multiple linear regression to explain reduced
child malnutrition in developing countries be-
tween1970 and 1995, democracy had the weak -
est correlation to hunger reduction. Other underly -
ing determinants, such as women’s education, per
capita food availability, women’s status relative to
men, improvements in the public health environment
(such as access to safe water), and per capita
national income, all emerged as more powerful
explainers (Smith and Haddad 2000).
We will argue later that promoting the democ -
ratization of some political systems in the develop -
ing world (in countries with minimal internal ethnic
conflict or at a more advanced stage of urbaniza -
tion) is both a worthy and realistic objective for
food-security purposes, because a democratic rule
of law is likely to be better for the poor than nonac -
countable rule by the strong or corrupt. Nonethe-
less, there is little evidence to suggest that democ -
ratization by itself can bring economic prosperity
to poor countries. According to a 1995 review of
20 separate empirical studies, half of the studies
had found no significant relationship between
democracy and economic growth. Three did find a
positive relationship, and five found a conditional
positive relationship, but two actually found a neg -
ative relationship (Brunetti and Weder 1995). A
subsequent review of 12 additional studies uncov -
ered a slightly stronger link between democracy
and growth, but only slightly stronger. Of these
12 more recent studies, only one found a negative
correlation between democracy and growth, while
seven found a positive relationship and the remain -
ing four showed results that were either inconclusive
or mixed (Goldsmith 2001). In Africa specifically,
no studies have found the few emerging democra -
cies in the region since the 1990s to be any more
prone than their predecessors to adopt economic
reform programs or do better than authoritarian
regimes in the region in terms of economic growth,
stable prices, or balanced budgets. African democ -
racies in the 1990s on the whole did neither better
nor worse than nondemocracies (Goldsmith 2001).
The important case of China suggests that it is
entirely possible to increase food security without
moving all the way to democracy. Beginning in
1978 a nondemocratic Chinese regime led by Deng
Xiaoping introduced new market incentives and
individual household land contracts into the nation’s
farming sector, thus giving farm families more secure
13control over their land and labor. At the same time,
it made substantial public investments in agricultural
research and rural infrastructure, particularly roads.
Over the next two decades China’s total grain out -
put increased 65 percent, from 305 million tons to
annual levels averaging 500 million tons by 1999.
The Chinese farmers who participated in this impres -
sive feat saw their incomes rise markedly as well.
Annual per capita net income for rural people in
China increased from a destitute level of only 134
yuan in 1978 to 2,210 yuan ($276) by 1999. As
a result, the absolute number of Chinese people liv -
ing in poverty—unable to feed, clothe, or house
themselves adequately—fell from 250 million in
1978 to only 34 million by 1999 (Chen 2000). This
sharp decline in absolute numbers of poor people
was all the more impressive given China’s continued
overall population growth. Never before in human
history have so many people escaped deep poverty
and food insecurity so quickly. China’s leaders were
not providing their citizens with a competitive elec -
toral democracy, but they were providing essential
public goods such as road and power infrastructures
in rural areas, property security (including household
control over land), access to a system of market-
based exchange, and public investment in research.
National Public Goods versus
Global Public Goods
In many sectors in today’s age of globalization, the
greatest public goods deficits are no longer at the
national level, but rather, at the regional or global
level (Kaul, Grunberg, and Stern 1999). In finance,
trade, communications, transport, public health, mon -
etary policy, and environmental protection globaliza -
tion has increased the need for common interna-
tional regulatory frameworks and mutual assistance
schemes. The struggle has been to design and
empower global institutions capable of delivering
these global public goods. Yet in food supply and
food security, today’s most conspicuous public goods
deficits are not found at the global level. While the
demand for such public goods at the regional or
global level has certainly increased in recent
decades, fortunately the supply of these goods has
also increased. It is at the national level that public
goods deficits remain most pronounced. In order to
make this point with adequate precision, we must first
examine at some length the relatively strong per -
formance of international institutions in delivering the
global public goods most important to food security
and hunger reduction in poor countries.
14Global governance institutions for food security and
hunger reduction are poorly funded and far from per -
fect. Nonetheless, they work well enough to provide
an impressive range of tangible hunger-reducing
global benefits. Function by function, the governance
institutions currently in place at the international level
have done a relatively good job of delivering the
essential public goods they were designed to pro -
vide. Consider three global food-security functions in
particular: the regulation of international commodity
markets, the international delivery of food aid (includ -
ing the provision of famine early warning and famine





Today’s problems of malnutrition and food insecurity
in Africa, and elsewhere in the developing world,
are not strongly linked to the governance of global
food markets. International food markets are not an
especially important factor one way or the other.
Local commodity markets are far more important
than international markets in determining the nutri -
tional circumstances of the poor. It is generally
wealthy countries, not poor countries, that dominate
international markets for food and animal feed, both
as importers and as exporters. Genuinely poor coun -
tries tend to be less prominent exporters into these
international markets, and only a few are heavily
reliant as importers. International food markets
do tend to be heavily used by some upper-
middle-income developing countries in the oil-
p roducing regions of the Middle East and by rapidly
industrializing countries in East Asia. Yet these coun -
tries are not genuinely poor and their hunger prob -
lems are far less severe than those of Sub-Saharan
Africa, South Asia, or even Central America.
If we consider only those developing countries
that are genuinely poor (defined as those with a
gross national product (GNP) per capita of $1,000
or less in constant 1987 dollars) and measure im-
port dependence on world food markets as the ratio
of annual cereal imports to annual national produc -
tion, Table 6 shows average poor-county regional
import dependence for 1973 and 1993. These data
reveal that dependence on international cereal mar -
kets is quite low for most genuinely poor countries. It
has been extremely low and declining for the gen -
uinely poor nations of East and South Asia (this
includes China, Indonesia, India, and Bangladesh
under the definition of poverty used here).
This poor-country pattern of not relying heavily
on world markets for grain imports goes against
some of the expectations popularized by respected
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Table 6—Poor country (GNP per capita
less than $1,000) grain import




Sub-Saharan Africa 10.0 13.6
South Asia 5.5 2.0
East Asia and Pacific 5.3 3.8
Latin America and Caribbean 17.6 36.5
Middle East and North Africa 22.5 8.3
All poor countries 6.4 5.2
Source:  FAO (1973, 1975, 1985, 1993, and 1995).analysts several decades ago. In 1977, IFPRI pro -
jected that India’s food import dependence would
increase rather than decline, and would reach
10–12 percent by 1990. IFPRI expected that by
1990 Bangladesh’s food import dependence
would be as high as 30–35 percent (IFPRI 1977).
We can see in retrospect that these projections were
off by several orders of magnitude. In the case of
India and Bangladesh, analysts two decades ago
badly overestimated the willingness of poor-country
governments in South Asia to depend on the world
market for imports. Nations in this region do have
unsatisfied food needs, yet their restrictive food
importing policies have kept reliance on world mar -
kets to a minimum.
Perhaps restricting imports is an excusable pol -
icy in countries where the prevalence of hunger is
declining, as in South Asia. But it is difficult to
understand how it could be acceptable in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Table 6 shows that among the
increasingly hungry countries of Sub-Saharan
Africa, dependence on the world market for imports
remains minimal. Sub-Saharan Africa imports a
total quantity of cereals (combining both commer -
cial purchases and food aid) equal to less than
15 percent of annual domestic production. By
focusing only on grains, Table 6 actually overstates
the import dependency of poor countries in Africa.
Taking into account foods other than cereals (such
as tubers and root crops, for example) Africa’s
dependence on imports from the world market is
lower than 15 percent. The World Bank estimates
that while more than 10 percent of Africa’s total
grain consumption may have been imported in
1988–92, only 6.5 percent of total calorie con -
sumption in Africa came from imported grains
(Ingco, Mitchell, and McCalla 1996).
Such averaged or aggregated estimates con -
ceal significant variations within the region of
course. If data from regional grain exporters such
as South Africa and Zimbabwe are excluded, the
import dependence of the rest of Sub-Saharan
Africa is somewhat higher in most years. Yet even
so past expectations regarding Africa’s food import
dependence have simply not come to pass. IFPRI in
1977 projected much higher import dependency
ratios for all of Sub-Saharan Africa, including a
44–46 percent import dependency ratio by 1990
for the Sahelian countries in particular.
Only in Latin America and the Caribbean do
we find a grouping of genuinely poor countries
where import dependence on international cereal
markets has been relatively high, and climbing. The
genuinely poor countries in this region—Bolivia,
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Peru—
imported 4.6 million tons of cereals in 1993, while
producing only 8.0 million tons at home, giving
them an import dependence ratio of 36.5 percent,
well above the 17.6 percent ratio seen in 1973.
These poor western hemisphere nations, rather than
the poor nations of Africa, appear to have the
largest interest in good governance of international
grain markets, yet these are all relatively small
nations with relatively small populations currently
experiencing food deprivation. Together, these poor
western hemisphere countries contain only 1.3 per -
cent of the world’s citizens, and they take only 2 per -
cent of world cereal imports. So even if their import
needs were suddenly to double or triple, the world
market would be able to accommodate the increase.
Apart from the limited dependence of poor
countries on global food markets, we must ask how
well managed those markets are. Advocates of
improved global governance might argue that
dependence on world markets for imports is low
among poor countries today precisely because of
those markets’ substandard performance. Perhaps if
world food markets were better managed and more
dependable, poor countries would be willing to
depend more upon them. While there is certainly
room for improvement, from the vantage point of
importers international food and commodity markets
have in fact performed quite well, often much better
than internal food markets in most poor countries.
One way to judge the performance of inter-
national food markets from the vantage point of poor-
country importers is to look at the changing
purchase price of basic staple grains in those mar -
kets. Over the long term, these prices have fallen
significantly. Adjusted for inflation, the price of
wheat and corn available for export from the
United States fell by 63 percent between 1910 and
1988. The price of wheat available for export fell
16by 67 percent over this same period (Johnson
1991). Because ocean transport costs declined as
well over these decades, the final import price for
poor countries fell even more in real terms.
Economic models suggest that the import price
of cereals on the world market will remain low even
if some large developing countries should abandon
their current practice of avoiding use of those mar -
kets. For example, if personal incomes in India were
to grow rapidly, causing meat consumption there to
double by 2020 over the currently projected level,
and if India, in consequence, began importing
much more meat and 26 million tons of cereals by
2020 (for livestock feed) rather than the currently
projected 6 million tons, the impact on world cere -
al prices would still be quite small. World maize
prices might increase by 5 percent rather than
decline by 1 percent, and wheat prices might
decline by 3 percent rather than decline by 8 per -
cent (Rosegrant et al. 2001). 
It could be argued that the low price of cereals
on the world market is partly a consequence of sub -
sidized food production in rich countries and that
it indirectly weakens food security by allowing
governments in poor countries to skimp on agricul -
tural investments and instead rely on imports from
abroad. This would be a stronger argument if the
poor countries in South Asia and Africa—those with
the most acute food-security problems today—had
in fact allowed themselves to become significantly
reliant on food imports. But as noted above, most
of these very poor countries have decided not to
rely on imports, in hopes of being able to claim
“national self-sufficiency” in basic food supplies. 
The price of food on the world market has been
low and declining overall, yet importers do suffer
from occasional price spikes. One example was the
relatively sudden increase in international wheat
prices between 1994 and 1996, from an average
$157 per ton in the 1994/95 season to a momen -
tary high of $271 per ton in early May 1996.
These price spikes have sometimes been caused by
malfunctions from well beyond the food and farm
sector, such as inflationary or deflationary macro -
economic policies or adverse trends in international
financial confidence. Yet sometimes world market
price spikes do reflect the poor governance of inter -
national food markets. One reason for the price
increase between 1994 and 1996 was a destabi -
lizing policy switch within the European Union away
from subsidizing exports toward imposing duties
on exports as international markets tightened. As
noted, the disciplines of the WTO have yet been
insufficient to block all such market-destabilizing rich
country policies. Such flaws not-withstanding, inter -
national markets provide important and mostly de-
pendable options to importers, and when prices go
up suddenly it usually does not take long for an off -
setting global production response to follow. The
1996 price spike in international wheat markets trig -
gered so much added global production that by
1998 the export price of wheat on the world market
had fallen back down to below the 1994/95 level.
There are reasons to believe that price stability
in world food markets will in any case improve in
the years ahead, as the volume of food traded on
those markets continues to grow (international cereal
markets today are already 50 percent larger than
they were in the 1970s) and as the agricultural poli -
cies of the nations that dominate those markets
continue to move gradually away from the use of
destabilizing illiberal practices. The industrial coun -
tries in Europe, North America, and the Far East
that have long been the shapers of world food mar -
kets continue to subsidize their own farmers heavily.
Yet they have now taken at least some steps to
restrict the use of highly trade-destabilizing policy
instruments, such as nontariff import restrictions and
export subsidies. The international Agreement on
Agriculture that emerged from the Uruguay Round
negotiations is designed to add further stability to
international prices by converting nontariff barriers
to tariffs, and also by reducing permitted export sub -
sidy use. Under the Agreement, permitted budget
expenditures for export subsidies were reduced by
36 percent and the permitted volume of subsidized
exports was reduced by 21 percent over a 10-year
period (Dixit 1996). These disciplines are relatively
weak, as noted earlier, but they do move the
governance of international food markets in the
right direction. 
International grain market price fluctuations
receive considerable attention, and they are an im-
portant issue for the heaviest users of international
17grain markets (mostly the nonpoor). But these price
fluctuations have never been the main source of food
insecurity among genuinely poor developing coun -
tries. This can be said even for the so-called “world
food crisis” period of the 1970s, when world
market conditions were badly disrupted and then
widely blamed for a perceived increase in hunger.
At that time when the price of internationally traded
food rose sharply, it was simply assumed that hunger
in poor countries probably would increase. Yet there
was never much evidence to support this conclusion,
and in most cases it was an erroneous inference to
draw. Most genuinely poor countries relied so little
on the international market, or their internal markets
were so segmented by policy from the world market,
that their own domestic food prices moved up much
less than the world market prices. Also, while inter -
national food prices did rise on this occasion, the
principal reason was not a global food production
failure. High-income growth around the world, due
to easy credit and inflationary macroeconomic poli -
cies, had driven the price increases, and these were
macroeconomic circumstances under which most
people actually found themselves better fed.
Between 1971 and 1974 the real export price
of U.S. wheat increased by 103 percent and the
real export price of U.S. maize by 58 percent.
World food reserves simultaneously declined from
71 days worth of grain consumption to just 33 days
(Johnson 1991; Hopkins and Puchala 1978, 7).
Many analysts assumed that under these tightened
world market conditions only the rich would be able
to sustain their accustomed consumption levels. In
fact, it was the rich who cut back most during this
crisis, by reducing their per capita meat consump -
tion. Per capita food consumption in most genuine -
ly poor countries did not decline. FAO estimates of
1971–74 per capita grain consumption levels by
country and region (Table 7) show no overall pat -
tern of decline. While per capita consumption did
decline slightly in some nations or regions, else -
where in the developing world per capita cereal
consumption either remained steady or actually
rose while the “food crisis” was at its worst.
Consumption adjustments were small in poor
countries in part because the world market worked
well enough to trigger large adjustments in rich
countries. In 1973–74 when grain prices rose, the
feeding of grain to livestock declined in the United
States by 37 million tons, or approximately 25 per -
cent. Canada and Australia also cut feed use in
response to high prices. Use of feed grains declined
so much in key exporting states in 1973–75 that it
was possible at the height of this so-called world
food crisis for the rest of the world to continue
increasing grain consumption, not only by people
but also by animals (Johnson 1991). Reduced feed
use of grains in wealthy exporting countries did not
result in food insecurity among the wealthy, of
course; it led to higher meat prices and reduced
consumption of red meat, which was on balance a
nutritional benefit.
The later increase in world cereal export prices
in 1995–96 also failed to produce any noticeable
decline in per capita consumption in genuinely
poor countries. Between 1994/95 and 1995/96
U.S. wheat export prices increased from $157 per
ton to $216 per ton, and world cereal stocks
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Table 7—Consumption of all cereals—wheat,
maize, rice, other coarse grains—
by IFPRI IMPACT regions, 1971 and
1974 (kilograms per capita)
Region/Country 1971 1974




Other Latin America 108 107
Africa Nigeria 64 61
Central and West Africa 66 65
Southern Africa 115 117
East Africa 70 78
Egypt 165 174
Asia West Asia/North Africa 155 167
India 130 126
Pakistan 115 125
Other South Asia 96 99
Indonesia 125 135
Malaysia 157 160
The Philippines 114 119
Myanmar 176 175
Other Southeast Asia 161 168
Source:FAO (2001) compiled into regions used for IFPRI's
IMPACT model.as a percentage of world consumption fell from
17.8 percent to just 14.1 percent, generating talk
of another world food crisis. Yet the imports of most
developing countries were sustained and average
per capita food use of cereals in developing coun -
tries overall continued to increase. Average annual
per capita cereal consumption in the developing
world as a whole actually increased from 170 kilo -
grams in 1994/95 to 171 kilograms in 1995/96,
and then to 172 kilograms in 1996/97, despite
much higher world grain prices (FAO 1998).
In many poor countries food consumption cir -
cumstances were actually better in the mid-1970s
and then again in the mid-1990s when grain
export prices were high, than in the mid-1980s
when grain export prices were low. Over the “food
crisis” decade of the 1970s, the share of the popu -
lation that was chronically malnourished signifi -
cantly dropped in Latin America from 19 to 13 per -
cent, in the Near East from 22 to 12 percent, and
in Sub-Saharan Africa it remained steady (at rough -
ly one-third) despite exceptionally rapid population
growth in that region (USDA 1995, 46). 
During the 1980s, in contrast, when world
grain markets were slack, export prices low, and
world stocks abundant, food consumption circum -
stances in many poor countries actually worsened.
In Africa overall, rates of dietary improvement fell
by two-thirds during the 1980s compared to the
1970s, and FAO estimated that the number of
chronically undernourished people in Latin America
and the Caribbean grew from 46 million around
1980 to over 60 million by the early 1990s, reach -
ing roughly 14 percent of the population
(Alexandratos 1995; FAO 1991). The 1980s were
marked by low international grain prices (described
as a world food glut at the time). Yet this decade
was one of severe food crisis within both Africa and
Latin America due to the onset of a world recession.
High interest rates after 1980 and lower world
demand brought reduced income and export earn -
ings to these developing regions, unserviceable
external debts, and almost no income growth. For
Latin America and the Caribbean, real GDP growth
rates fell from a 1970s annual average of 5.7 per -
cent to just 1.2 percent in the 1980s. For Sub-
Saharan Africa, real GDP growth fell from a 1970s
annual average of 3.4 percent to a 1980s annual
average of just 1.8 percent (Grindle 1996, 20).
Under these circumstances hunger increased,
despite the abundance of grain on the world mar -
ket (Paarlberg 2000).
Fluctuating world food market conditions are
therefore not by themselves a reliable indicator of
food insecurity or hunger in most poor countries.
Internationalists have repeatedly sought to improve
world food security by imposing tighter regulations
on price movements in international markets or by
creating grain reserves and compensatory finance
mechanisms to assist importers. But the evidence
suggests that little would be gained by adding such
supplementary governance features to world food
markets. International markets for other kinds of
goods, such as currency exchange and finance, are
clearly in need of improved global governance. The
free international flow of capital promoted in the
1990s by institutions like the IMF has at times
imposed needlessly harsh adjustment burdens on
the poor, leading in East Asia after 1997 to a tem -
porary increase in hunger. Yet by comparison, inter -
national food and commodity markets have operat -
ed remarkably well. The poor countries in the
developing world that have been willing to use
these markets, rather than impose arbitrary anti -
trade restrictions in the name of self-sufficiency,
have found them to be an affordable and mostly
reliable supplementary source of food supplies.
Yet developing countries with food-security prob -
lems require more than well-functioning international
markets for the import of food. They also need effec -
tive international markets for their own farm com -
modity exports, and here the international market
does less well in providing for the needs of poor
countries. Especially for developing countries able to
export value-added products in competition with
industrial country farmers, the international market -
place remains marred by serious protection. Indus-
trial countries have at times been able, despite WTO
rules, to impose restrictions on commodity imports,
reducing export earnings for the developing world
and harming the income prospects of poor farmers. 
For example, in 1998 the European Union
established a new regulation limiting the amount of
aflatoxins in imported food. This new regulation set
19an aflatoxin standard tighter than that suggested by
several international food safety governance bod -
ies, including the Codex Alimentarius Commission
in Rome, FAO, and the World Health Organization.
Moreover, the health benefits that E.U. citizens can
gain from this higher standard are likely to be triv -
ial. The World Bank estimates that the difference
between the new E.U. standard and the Codex
standard may help Europe to avoid only 1.4 deaths
per year for every one billion consumers. Yet it
could reduce cereal, dried fruit, and nut exports to
Europe from nine African countries (Chad, Egypt,
Gambia, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa,
Sudan, and Zimbabwe) by 64 percent, costing
these exporters $700 million each year (Otsuki,
Wilson, and Sewadeh 2000).
Such restrictive measures by importers are seri -
ous market malfunctions. Still, evidence suggests
they are not the chief reason why most commodity
producers in Africa have lost export sales. Africa’s
agricultural exports have dwindled not so much
because of import protection by rich countries as
due to prejudicial sectoral and macroeconomic
policies imposed by African governments at home.
Between 1962–64 and 1991–93, Sub-Saharan
Africa’s share of various agricultural commodity
exports (such as vegetable oils, palm oil, palm nuts
and kernels, and groundnuts) dropped 47–80 per -
centage points below earlier levels. Between 1955
and 1990 Sub-Saharan Africa’s share of global
exports of all products fell from 3.1 percent to just
1.2 percent, implying substantial annual trade loss -
es. Yet the World Bank determined that this disap -
pointing export performance could not be
explained by industrialized country import policies.
African exporters have tended to face lower aver -
age tariffs than other exporters. Nontariff protection
against African exports is also generally less restric -
tive than that facing other developing countries. The
overall external environment for exports facing
Africa today (tariff and nontariff) is actually more
favorable than that which today’s more wealthy
East Asian economies previously faced and over -
came (Yeats, Amjadi, and Reincke 1996). 
Africa’s damaging marginalization in world
commodity trade more nearly reflects impediments
within the region itself to efficient commodity pro -
duction and export. Africa’s shrinking share of
world trade is most accurately described by Jeffrey
Sachs as a “self-imposed economic exile” (Sachs
1996). Most African states have not actively pur -
sued a trade-linked growth strategy. Trade policies
in most other regions have moved slowly toward
greater liberalization within the WTO, but during
the recent Uruguay Round of trade negotiations
the African continent mostly sought exemptions
from trade-liberalizing obligations (Hertel, Masters,
and Elbehri 1998). 
Governance deficits at the international level
are thus not the principal reason why some poor
countries are failing to make gains from inter-
national commodity markets. These markets offer
importers, in particular, an abundant supply of food
commodities at prices low and stable enough to
make the risks associated with dependence on com -
mercial imports acceptable. Some poor and food-
insecure countries remain reluctant to engage in
commercial imports but the markets are nonetheless
available as a valuable global public good for
those that opt to use them.
International Food Aid
The availability of sufficient international food assis -
tance might be viewed as a second important inter -
national public good. Arranging adequate food
imports on commercial terms can be difficult for poor
countries with large external debts and lagging for -
eign exchange earnings. The poor citizens of such
countries, particularly those living in urban areas,
may require a well functioning global concessional
food assistance system to supplement commercial
food markets. Concessional food aid since the late
1980s has in fact provided more than 40 percent of
total cereal imports for over 40 recipient countries,
mostly in Africa (FAO 1996). Fortunately, food aid
is another area where existing global governance
institutions have generally performed well.
The international food assistance system is still
dominated by national governmental institutions at
both the donor and the recipient end. Virtually all
international food assistance is financed by indus -
trial world governments. NGOs do play a visible
role in channeling food aid, but 97 percent of the
20food they deliver is financed either by the United
States, the European Commission, or by other indi -
vidual national governments in Europe, Canada, or
Japan. Only 3 percent of food aid delivered by
INGOs is actually financed by the INGOs them -
selves (WFP 2001a). Governmental donors coordi -
nate their efforts through a variety of international
governance institutions, particularly the international
Food Aid Convention (also called the London
Convention). This Convention is a legal international
agreement that lays down minimum annual food
aid commitments, donor by donor, either in terms of
total tonnage or market value. The 1999 version of
the Food Aid Convention set an aggregate mini -
mum annual commitment from donors of 4.895 mil -
lion tons of food assistance, plus a total value com -
mitment of  €130 million. Commodities considered
eligible for these commitments include grain, pulses,
edible oil, root crops, skimmed milk powder, sugar,
and seed for eligible commodities. The United
States and the European Union dominate as food
aid donors. Since 1995 these two have coordinat -
ed their actions separately under a food-security
coordination program, as part of the U.S.–
E.U. Transatlantic Agenda consultation process
(Christensen 1999).
Food assistance is delivered through a wide
variety of channels, but again national govern-
mental institutions tend to dominate. More than half
(55 percent) of all global food aid moves directly
from donor institutions to recipient governments.
Another 29 percent moves through multilateral
public-sector channels (almost entirely through the
World Food Programme), and 16 percent is chan -
neled through INGOs. Some food aid channeled
internationally via multilateral public-sector agen -
cies such as the World Food Programme is sub-
sequen tly distributed by INGOs or NGOs within
recipient nations.
Food assistance is delivered to recipient nations
in three general forms: as emergency relief, as proj -
ect assistance designed to improve nutrition and
support development (project aid), or through a
continuing government-to-government commodity
transfer program (program food aid). In 1999,
32 percent of all global food aid deliveries were for
emergency relief (almost half of that went to Asia,
in particular North Korea), 17 percent were project
food aid deliveries (40 percent of which went to
Sub-Saharan Africa), and 51 percent were pro -
gram food aid deliveries, where Russia was the
main recipient.
The adequacy of this global food aid delivery
system was twice briefly called into question in the
mid-1990s: following completion of the 1994
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture in the
WTO and following the 1996 enactment of new
agricultural legislation in the United States. The
1994 Uruguay Round Agreement raised concern
among some developing-country officials that
reduced domestic support to farmers in exporting
countries could result in lower surplus stocks,
increased international price variability, and
reduced incentives on the part of exporters to pro -
vide food aid (Ballenger and Mabbs-Zeno 1992).
These anxieties were aggravated when the U.S.
Congress in 1996 enacted a new farm law
designed to support agriculture with cash payments
to grain farmers—payments substantially decou -
pled from traditional production incentives (Orden,
Paarlberg, and Roe 1999). Roughly half of all inter -
national cereal food aid traditionally came from the
United States, so this policy move away from strong
direct production incentives to farmers suggested
that a traditional foundation of food aid—surplus
production in wealthy countries—might be eroding.
From today’s vantage point, these concerns
appear to have been exaggerated. The Uruguay
Round Agreement on Agriculture actually took great
care to protect the functioning of international food
aid systems. First it restated donor countries’ obli -
gations to set their commitment levels to the Food
Aid Convention high enough to meet the reason -
able needs of developing countries during the trade
liberalization process. Second, it exempted food
aid shipments from the tightened restrictions on
export subsidies imposed by the Agreement. Even
program food aid shipments arranged through
long-term credit agreements, such as the substantial
U.S. grain exports funded under Title I of Public Law
480, were exempt from any new restriction under
the Agreement (Christensen 1999). In the case of
the new 1996 U.S. farm law, while it did promise
to contain the size of publicly held food stocks, in
21some other respects the new law was actually good
for international food abundance because it
increased commercial production potential in the
United States by eliminating the authority of the U.S.
Department of Agriculture to impose annual
acreage reduction requirements (called ARPs) on
farmers receiving income support payments.
Since the mid-1990s food aid shipments have
in fact been sustained above World Food
Programme minimums, despite the new WTO
agreement and despite the new U.S. farm bill.
World Food Programme data show that interna -
tional food aid deliveries did dip briefly in
1996–97, at a time when momentarily higher
world grain prices discouraged large donor contri -
butions. But total donor contributions never fell
below the annual minimum of 5.4 million tons of
cereals then prevailing under the Food Aid Con-
vention. By 1998–99, as world grain prices fell,
donor contributions climbed once again. Table 8
shows the total tonnage of global food aid deliv -
ered over 1990–99.
Recent trends in Sub-Saharan Africa specifically
provide additional reassurance that the international
food aid system can continue to provide adequate
concessional flows. Program food aid to African
governments has generally declined over the past
decade, but project food aid for nutrition and devel -
opment purposes has substantially increased, and
emergency relief has been able to increase when
necessary, as it did following the  severe southern
African drought of 1991–92. Table 9  shows recent
trends in food aid deliveries to Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The availability of international food aid for
emergency relief has played a significant role in
containing some kinds of hunger, particularly in
Africa. Emergency food aid is not always able to
contain famine in Africa, but when failures occur
the international governance of food aid is usually
not the problem. Ethiopia’s difficult experience
helps put such issues in perspective. Food aid
arrived too late in Ethiopia to prevent famine in
1984. Most PL-480 shipments from the United
States arrived in 1985 and 1986, and by then the
worst of the famine had passed and a recovery of
local production was already under way (Barrett
2001). Yet in this case the tardy arrival of the food
aid could be blamed mostly on reluctance by the
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Table 8—Global food aid deliveries, cereals in grain equivalent, 1990–99 (million tons)
Contribution 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Relief 2.0 3.4 5.0 4.2 4.5 3.5 2.7 3.3 3.0 4.7
Program 8.4 6.9 7.7 10.6 5.7 4.3 2.9 1.8 2.7 7.4
Project 2.7 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.7 2.3 1.7 2.3 2.6 2.4
Total 13.1 12.8 15.3 17.3 12.9 10.1 7.3 7.4 8.3 14.5
Source:WFP (2000).
Note: 1999 data are provisional.
Table 9—Food aid deliveries to Sub-Saharan Africa, cereals in grain equivalent, 1990–99
(million tons)
Contribution 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Relief 1.5 2.4 3.7 3.0 3.0 2.0 1.6 1.3 1.6 1.6
Program 0.9 1.0 1.9 1.2 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.3
Project 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.7 1.0
Total 2.9 4.0 6.2 4.9 4.5 3.3 2.5 2.4 2.9 2.9
Source:WFP (2000). 
Note: 1999 data are provisional.Ethiopian government, earlier in 1984, to allow
any international reporting of the severity of its
growing internal food crisis. In 1999–2000, inter -
national food aid shipments again arrived too late
in Ethiopia to prevent famine deaths amid a dam -
aging drought. Significant international humanitar-
ian intervention began only in April 2000, by
which time more than 70,000 people had already
died. Yet World Food Programme officials point out
that while some lives were lost before April, many
more lives were subsequently saved by food aid.
The World Food Programme eventually provided
food to 2.5 million people in Ethiopia’s Somali
region. Had there not been civil unrest in this
region, even more could have been reached.
When recipient governments are prepared to
cooperate and when there is no violent internal
conflict underway to obstruct an international relief
effort, the international food aid system is usually
able to provide timely assistance. One recently
developed international governance instrument that
has helped speed food aid relief has been the World
Food Programme’s $20 million Immediate Response
Account (IRA) system. Since 1993, this funding
mechanism has given program officials working in
developing countries the option to launch food aid
operations immediately, on their own initiative, at
funding levels up to $200,000 each. In 2000, coun -
try directors used this authority 11 times in countries
such as Nicaragua, Zambia, Mozambique, and
Viet Nam. IRA funds were also used to initiate
larger emergency food assistance operations in
Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Kenya (WFP 2001b).
Improved international famine early warning
systems have become another important feature
strengthening international food aid governance.
These systems use a combination of market-price
and meteorological data monitoring, plus increas -
ingly sophisticated remote sensing satellite informa -
tion, to plan and mobilize responses to food emer -
gencies before they become acute. To illustrate the
potential of these systems, consider the effective inter -
national response when widespread drought hit
southern Africa in 1991–92. The drought cut aggre -
gate cereal production in the region by more than
50 percent on average; and in Malawi, Namibia,
Swaziland, and Zimbabwe cereal production actu -
ally fell by 60–70 percent. Because of already
depleted maize stocks in the region, the drought put
17–20 million people at risk of starvation. Yet
famine deaths were reported only in Mozambique,
where relief was politically and logistically impossi -
ble because a civil war was still under way.
Starvation was avoided in the rest of the region
because per capita food aid increased quickly and
dramatically, from an average of less than 10 kilo -
grams per person in the 1980s to a peak of more
than 25 kilograms per person in 1992 (Pinstrup-
Andersen, Pandya-Lorch, and Babu 1997).
Improved international early warning systems
played a key role in facilitating timely delivery of this
assistance. In December 1991, famine early warn -
ing systems supported by FAO picked up the devel -
oping drought, and by the end of February 1992
the systems confirmed the situation was critical. In
March and April, FAO and the World Food
Programme sent joint crop and food-supply assess -
ment missions to the region, to judge food import
and food aid needs for the coming year and to com -
plete a comprehensive logistics assessment, includ -
ing a review of port capacities in South Africa.
FAO/World Food Programme coordination with
national governments was accomplished through a
regional institution, the Southern African Develop-
ment Community (SADC). To ensure adequate finan -
cial and commodity support from the international
donor community, FAO’s Global Information and
Early Warning System (GIEWS) issued a special
alert in April 1992, which was followed up by a
joint U.N.–SADC consolidated appeal for assis -
tance. Donor response to this appeal was gratifying,
as pledges received covered 82 percent of all tar -
geted food aid requests and 89 percent of all pro -
gramme food aid requests.
To move the assistance, SADC formed six differ -
ent “corridor groups” to handle port, rail, and road
transport through the region. Contributions to trans -
port and logistics were roughly twice the amount
requested by SADC and came from a wide variety of
donors including numerous NGOs and other con -
cerned institutions that participated actively and effec -
tively in the various relief activities (FAO 1996,
Volume 3, 42–45). Donors then worked through the
World Food Programme to create a logistic advisory
23center to collect and share information related to
potential port and transport bottlenecks. Both FAO’s
GIEWS and the U.S. bilateral Famine Early Warning
System Network (FEWS-Net) developed and made
use of extensive networks of on-the-ground informants
to gather and then disseminate information. The inter -
national response in southern Africa was a remark -
able achievement in providing the global public
good of famine early warning and prevention.
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International food assistance efforts have been
far less successful in cases where recipient govern -
ments either deny information (as did Ethiopia in
1984) or block international access (as with the
North Korean famine after 1995) or where violent
internal conflicts prevent relief from reaching the
individuals in need. Violent conflicts are not only a
leading cause of short-term food emergencies in
much of the developing world, they are also a lead -
ing barrier to effective international relief. The tem -
porary interruption of World Food Programme over -
land relief to vulnerable populations in Afghanistan
following the onset of a U.S. bombing campaign in
October 2001 is the most recent case in point, but
a number of African examples are also illustrative:
￿ Widespread drought in eastern and western
Sub-Saharan Africa in the mid-1980s led to
failed harvests for three consecutive years in a
number of countries, threatening the survival of
vulnerable populations. More than 35 million
people were directly affected, and some 10 mil -
lion eventually left their homes in search of food
and water. Yet in the affected countries where
peaceful conditions prevailed, international
food relief was provided with gratifying success
(Deng and Minear 1992). As Jean Dreze later
observed, “Though drought threatened a large
number of African countries at that time, only
some of them—notably war-torn ones—actually
experienced large-scale famine” (Dreze 1995).
￿ When northern Sudan faced a severe drought
in the mid-1980s, it managed to avoid wide -
spread starvation thanks in part to the accept -
ance and distribution of $1 billion in external
assistance. Yet when violent civil conflict later
escalated in southern Sudan, relief could not be
delivered to areas still being affected by
drought so hundreds of thousands starved
between 1986 and 1988. By 1988 roughly
half of the population in southern Sudan had
been displaced by fighting, and famine deaths
in that year alone reached 250,000. A new
international relief effort (Operation Lifeline
Sudan) was mounted in response to this conflict-
linked emergency. But it was far less successful
than the earlier international drought relief
effort in the north, due in part to armed attacks
on food shipments by the warring parties (Deng
and Minear 1992).
￿ Somalia, Ethiopia, and northern Kenya were all
devastated by the same widespread drought
beginning in late 1991. Yet in the latter two
countries there were few deaths because inter -
national relief efforts were able to get food to
those at risk. In Somalia, however, food relief
shipments were blocked by armed subclan mili -
tia groups engaged in a struggle for political
control, leading to significant starvation.
Minimum food security was temporarily restored
in Somalia only after U.S. military intervention
late in 1992 afforded protection to international
food relief shipments (Natsios 1996).
International food assistance can thus be
viewed as an area where coordination and gover -
nance mechanisms at the international level are
quite advanced. The global governance achieved is
certainly far from perfect. Food aid availability is
still too closely tied to donor country agricultural sur -
pluses, implying that too much is sometimes given
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3  Africa’s food problems are sometimes blamed on the region’s weak capacity for regional cooperation. Yet for food aid, compe -
tent regional governance institutions are already in place. In the eastern part of Africa and in the horn of Africa, food aid can now
be coordinated either through a fifteen-country regional institution—the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI)—managed by
USAID, or through the seven-state regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), consisting of Djibouti, Eritrea,
Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda (Christensen 1999).when it is least needed, depressing incomes of
farmers in recipient countries. Donors should pur -
chase more of their food aid supplies from farmers
in the developing world (“triangular” food aid),
thereby giving income to the producers in greatest
need. Nonetheless, these flaws have not prevented
the current international food aid system from offer -
ing substantial benefits to poor countries, particu -
larly in times of famine emergency. The current food
aid system works surprisingly well, as long as local
governance problems within individual recipient
countries do not get in the way.
International Agricultural
Research
Agricultural research is another area in which the
governance deficits of concern to poor countries
are less pronounced at the international level than
at the national level. At the international level, an
expanded and highly capable Consultative Group
on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR)
has been operating for several decades now to pro-
vide the global public good of research avail-
able for use by farmers in poor countries. Unfor-
tunately the national agricultural research systems
(NARS) of many poor countries are simultaneously
deteriorating in terms of budget resources and
useful research outputs.
The emergence of the CGIAR is further testimony
to the capacity of international public institutions to
provide some important global public goods. When
the CGIAR was officially formed in 1971, it brought
together under World Bank leadership four interna -
tional agricultural research centers that had originally
been established by the Ford and Rockefeller foun -
dations. Today it has evolved into a 16-center system
that carries out technical and policy research relating
primarily to production of the major food commodi -
ties consumed by the world’s poor people, but now
with an eye toward protecting rural natural resources
and biological diversity as well. International coordi -
nation for these 16 centers is provided through the
World Bank by the CGIAR Secretariat, a chairper -
son, and the FAO-staffed Technical Advisory Commit-
tee (TAC). This coordination system is loosely knit and
decentralized. The CGIAR as a whole has no consti -
tution and no by-laws and it reaches decisions by
consensus. Individual centers are autonomous organ -
izations with independent legal status and finances.
Their research programs are separately directed by
each center’s board and management (Anderson
and Dalrymple 1999).
The research mission of the CGIAR is precisely
and explicitly to create global public goods. The
centers focus on problems that cut across national
borders or which lend themselves to international
solutions. Of the 16 international centers, 13 are
located in the developing world, yet they are con -
stituted explicitly as international centers with man -
dates and programs intended to be independent
from purely national or regional influences. The
centers’ germplasm resources are internationally
mobile and research results are made accessible to
all interested parties.
The CGIAR has an annual budget of roughly
$340 million, financed through voluntary contribu -
tions from 55 separate donor governments and
foundations plus the World Bank, FAO, the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).
Some 35–40 percent of all CGIAR expenditures go
toward research in improved crop, livestock, forest,
and fish productivity, with other CGIAR research
investments going to environmental protection,
improved policies, biodiversity protection, and
assistance to NARS. Despite its relatively small total
budget, the system has been able to generate a
stream of internationally useful research results.
Since the goal is to generate results that are usable
in more than one country, the CGIAR has tradition -
ally focused either on food crops that are widely
grown or those grown in different places under rel -
atively uniform conditions, such as wheat, maize,
and irrigated rice. Here the centers have enjoyed
early and continuing success. By the 1980s, germ-
plasm improved by the CGIAR was found in more
than 80 percent of all spring bread wheat grown in
the tropics, 72 percent of all rice varieties, and
more than 75 percent of maize varieties. By 1997,
CGIAR-improved varieties of wheat and maize
were generating, respectively, an extra $1.8 billion
and $1.0 billion worth of production every year
(Anderson and Dalrymple 1999, 54). By one esti -
25mate, some 80 percent of the calories and protein
required in tropical countries now derives from com-
modities whose productivity has been enhanced by
CGIAR-generated agricultural technologies.
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The demonstrated ability of the CGIAR system to
provide internationally usable public research goods
is a significant achievement for global governance.
Yet it runs against two serious limitations, both of
which derive from the underperformance of individ -
ual national governments. Some key governments
among the donor community have recently failed the
CGIAR by cutting back on their financial contribu -
tions; and many governments in the developing
world have fallen short by not making parallel invest -
ments in their own agricultural research programs.
Weak donor support has recently put the
CGIAR at risk. In its early years, the CGIAR could
depend on bilateral assistance from leading donor
countries, particularly the United States. As recently
as 1987, about two-thirds of all core funding for the
system came from bilateral foreign assistance, with
25 percent (about $47 million a year) coming from
USAID alone. But during the 1990s, USAID’s con -
tributions fell sharply, to a low of just $22.5 million
in 1996 before leveling off at about $26 million
annually by 2001. This fall in U.S. contributions
was not compensated by other major donors, so
during the mid-1990s the system faced a wrenching
financial crisis, one that was solved in part by a
temporary increase in contributions from another
international organization, the World Bank (which
contributed $10 million extra in both 1994 and
1995). This recent weakness in donor-country sup -
port for the CGIAR is part of a much larger pattern
of declining international assistance to agriculture.
Annual foreign aid by governments to all forms of
agriculture in poor countries fell by 57 percent be-
tween 1988 and 1996, from $9.24 billion to just
$4.0 billion. The World Bank officially bemoaned
this decline, yet annual World Bank lending for
agriculture and rural development also fell sharply,
from $6 billion in 1986 to $3.2 billion in 1998.
It is hard to justify this evaporation of donor
assistance to agriculture in poor countries given the
high rates of return on past investments, particu-
larly in re-search. More than 60 percent of all inter -
nationally assisted agricultural research programs
in Asia have yielded annual rates of return above
50 percent. Even in Africa and Latin America more
than 40 percent of such programs have had rates
of return above 50 percent (Anderson, Herdt, and
Scobie 1988, 88–97).
Overall, we can still argue that in international
commodity markets, international food aid, and
international agricultural research, the provision of
essential international public goods has been sub -
stantial. Failures by international institutions to pro -
vide global public goods have not been the princi -
pal cause of persistent hunger today in regions such
as South Asia or Sub-Saharan Africa. More serious
governance failures can usually be found at the
national level. The discussion that follows examines
this problem of national public goods provision in
Sub-Saharan Africa. It shows that an underprovi -
sion of key public goods by national governments
in Africa has significantly retarded agricultural pro -
ductivity in the region, contributing significantly to
the region’s deep and worsening food crisis.
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4  Letter from Lewis T. Preston, President of the World Bank; Jacques Diouf, Director General of FAO; and James Gustave Speth,
Administrator of UNDP, to Brian J. Atwood, Administrator of USAID, April 21, 1994.Food consumption deficits in Sub-Saharan Africa are
large and have recently been growing, as shown
earlier in Tables 2–4. Most expect these adverse
trends to continue, at least into the immediate future.
FAO’s 1996 World Food Summit projected the num -
ber of malnourished citizens in this region to in-
crease to 264 million by 2010 (FAO 1996). IFPRI’s
IMPACT model also projects an increasing incidence
of malnutrition in Sub-Saharan Africa. IFPRI forecasts
the incidence of child malnutrition to decline in every
other region of the developing world, but it is ex-
pected to increase in Sub-Saharan Africa, reaching
40 million by 2020, an increase of roughly 30 per -
cent from the 1995 level (Pinstrup-Andersen, Pandya-
Lorch, and Rosegrant 1999).
What is the source of this severe and worsening
African food crisis? It largely reflects a failure of gov -
ernance within Africa itself, specifically a failure by
individual sovereign governments in the region to
provide essential public goods at the national level
such as internal peace, rule of law, and adequate
public investment in rural infrastructure and agricul -
ture research. These goods are all essential to farm
productivity growth, and lagging rural income linked
to lagging farm productivity has been the most con -
spicuous element of Africa’s hunger crisis.
Africa's Hunger as a Farm
Productivity Problem
Recent production trends indicate a serious farming
lag in Africa. In the developing countries as a
whole between 1970 and 2000 per capita food
production increased by 51 percent. In Asia’s
developing countries in particular per capita food
production increased by 73 percent. Yet in Sub-
Saharan Africa per capita food production
decreased by 9 percent (FAO 2001). So Africa
stands alone not only because hunger is still on
the rise, but also because food production per
person is actually falling.
When explaining hunger and food insecurity,
some analysts don’t like to start with agricultural
production data. Particularly in some NGO circles
it is fashionable to argue that “production is not the
problem.” Poverty, they say, is the real problem,
because it weakens the capacity of the poor to pur -
chase food even when production is adequate and
prices are reasonable. Others prefer to view the
problem as one of “distribution,” again suggesting
that more production alone will be inadequate.
These are strong and valid arguments in many parts
of the developing world. In some parts of India, for
example, producing still more grain on good irri -
gated land may do little to relieve the widespread
hunger found among rural communities elsewhere
in the country, where the means to purchase ade -
quate food is lacking even when there are large sur -
pluses in the commercial marketplace. Likewise in
Latin America, producing still more soybeans on
large commercial farms in southern Brazil will do lit -
tle to help feed the landless or nearly landless poor
farmers who are struggling to produce tropical or
subsistence crops in the dry northeast. In Brazil, re-
solving distribution problems (including inequitable
land distribution) may be more important than over-
all farm productivity for the purpose of ending hunger.
Yet Africa is different. Landlessness is a less
severe problem in most of Africa, compared with
Latin America. Many Africans with access to land
remain hungry because the productivity of their
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Crisis and Food Securitylabor on that land remains low. Viewing Africa’s
hunger problem as a poverty problem is correct, but
it is usually the low productivity of farm labor in
Africa that leaves people poor—and hence hungry.
Africa’s poverty is undeniable. In 1995, the
average per capita income in Sub-Saharan Africa
(excluding South Africa) was only $280 per per -
son, less than a dollar a day, while average per -
sonal incomes in East Asia were three times higher
(Pinstrup-Andersen Pandya-Lorch, and Rosegrant
1999). But in Africa, poverty cannot be separated
from low farm productivity. Two-thirds of all Africans
still live in the countryside and remain heavily
dependent upon farming, grazing, and other agri -
culturally linked activities for their employment and
cash income. These Africans are still poor (and
hence hungry) because their efforts at agricultural
production have so far failed to generate significant
productivity gains. Farm production has increased
somewhat in Africa, but mostly as a function of
population growth (that is, as a consequence of
more labor input, not more productivity per unit of
labor). So the per capita income growth benefits
have been negligible. 
Comparisons to East and Southeast Asia are
revealing. Agriculture is a dominant activity among
the poor in East and Southeast Asia, just as it is in
Africa. But in these Asian regions higher produc-
tivity growth in farming has helped hundreds of
millions escape poverty and hunger. In East Asia in
the 1970s and 1980s, the successful introduction of
Green Revolution farming technologies increased
labor productivity, creating important opportunities
for income growth for most who worked the land.
Between 1980 and 1997 in China, the produc-
tivity of an average farm worker increased from
$161 to $307 in real terms. In Thailand produc-
tivity increased from $634 to $932. But in Sub-
Saharan Africa during the same period, average
agricultural value added per farm worker actually
declined, from $418 to $379 (World Bank 2000,
Table 8, 288–289). 
Productivity growth in farming usually helps to
stimulate economic growth overall, by creating
more income, savings, and investment. But it
improves the welfare of the rural poor even when
the rest of the economy is not growing rapidly. India
made significant gains against poverty in the 1970s
and 1980s because agricultural productivity
growth was high even while overall economic
growth remained relatively low. By the same token,
India’s more rapid overall economic growth in the
1990s has been slow to reduce poverty because
agricultural productivity growth (especially yield
growth in food staples) had slowed (Lipton 1999).
Africa’s lagging agricultural productivity in part
reflects the region’s failure to find and adopt more
productive farming technologies. New technologies
helped farmers in Asia and Latin America achieve
significant yield gains accompanied by income
improvements during the Green Revolution of the
1960s and 1970s. But most farmers in Africa did
not participate in this important technology
upgrade. Between 1970 and 1983, new high-
yielding rice varieties spread to about half of Asia’s
vast rice lands but only to about 15 percent of rice
land in Sub-Saharan Africa. Improved wheat vari -
eties spread to more than 90 percent of wheat
lands in Asia and Latin America but only to 59 per -
cent in Sub-Saharan Africa. By 1998 the overall
rate of adoption of new varieties (of all crops, as
a percentage of area) was 80 percent in Asia and
52 percent in Latin America, but only 26 percent in
Sub-Saharan Africa (Tuskegee University 2001).
This is the main reason why today’s average cereal
yields in Africa remain less than half those in Asia
and Latin America. The inability of African farmers
to access more productive technology has led them
to use other, more destructive methods to boost pro -
duction in pace with population growth. One exam -
ple is shortening fallows, a practice that mines soil
nutrients and can eventually lead to an actual
decline in crop yield per hectare.
How can we explain this African failure to
increase agricultural productivity and hence pro -
vide the higher incomes needed by most rural com -
munities as a path to improved nutrition? Natural
constraints on farming in Africa are certainly part of
the problem. The continent’s farmers face soil and
climate constraints that are noticeably more severe
than those found in most other developing regions.
This has created a burden for African agriculture
that even the best national governance institutions
might have trouble removing. 
28Natural Soil and Climate
Constraints to Farm Production
in Africa
It is no accident that only 6 percent of the African
continent is currently being used to plant arable
crops. Soils in Africa tend to be poor, even by the
standards of tropical countries, as they are highly
weathered, acidic, and generally low in fertility. Rain-
fall  tends to be either scarce, unreliable, or exces -
sive. An estimated two-thirds of the continent is sub -
ject to high risk of drought. Some 46 percent has less
than 75 days of rain a year, too little to grow even
millet. Tree planting, normally an option for soil con -
servation, is problematic in the large parts of Africa
that receive less than 1,000 millimeters of rainfall
each year. Compared with other tropical regions, a
much smaller part of Africa’s land mass is moder-
ated by proximity to oceans. Most of Africa lacks the
monsoon effects that provide more abundant rainfall
in much of Asia (Sachs and Bloom 1998). Where
water is uncertain, farmers tend to concentrate on
reducing risks rather than boosting yields. Water
and weather risks diminish the attraction of pur -
chased inputs such as fertilizers that might be used
to increase yield. Fertilizer use in Africa, at 12 kilo -
grams per hectare, is only one-quarter the level in
India and just one-thirty-sixth the level of Japan.
Temperature and topography also complicate
Africa’s farm productivity challenge. High tempera -
tures cause excessive evaporation in semi-arid
zones and depletion of soil organic matter in defor -
ested humid zones. Africa’s farming regions are
seldom variable enough in altitude (except in parts
of East Africa) to provide relief from the sea-level
heat and sustain a wide mix of crops. Local topog -
raphy also tends to be highly irregular, complicat -
ing the engineering of irrigation systems while
boosting road construction and other rural infra -
structure costs. Irrigation costs in Africa are roughly
double those of other continents. This is one reason
why irrigation covers only 4 percent of cultivated
area in Sub-Saharan Africa, compared with 26 per-
cent in India and 44 percent in China.
5
The many pests and diseases in Africa that
attack crops, livestock, and farmers are another nat -
ural impediment to higher productivity. As one ex-
ample, stem borers are a major pest problem for
Kenyan maize farmers, causing estimated losses
of 15–45 percent of each maize crop, reducing
Kenya’s annual farm earnings by an average of
6.3 billion shillings (Obure 2000). In West Africa,
cowpeas grown by women farmers on small plots
are a major source of protein and cash income for
200 million people. Yet insect damage from pod
borers and weevils can affect up to 95 percent of the
crop, depending on the location and year (Murdock
1999). Farm size tends to be small in Africa partly
because of the difficulty of keeping fields free from
the invasive weeds that grow rampant. Parasitic
weeds such as striga attack cereals and food
legumes in the arid savanna zones, while perennial
grasses force farmers to abandon prime lands in the
moist savanna (Akobundu 1991). As much as a
third of tropical Africa remains underexploited
because of the presence of trypanosomiasis, a par -
asitic disease that affects both people and livestock.
Because of these difficult natural conditions, it is
perhaps inevitable for farm productivity growth in
Africa to lag. Green Revolution crop varieties were
successful in Asia partly because of the greater
abundance of water, soil nutrients, and favorable
cropping terrain. Efforts to introduce improved vari -
eties in Africa, even for crops that are already
grown in the region such as sorghum, millet, and
rice, have often met failure (Dommen 1988). 
Given such natural disadvantages, it might seem
unfair to attribute any of Africa’s lagging farm pro -
ductivity to poor local governance. Yet the con -
straints mentioned do not have to block all improve -
ments in Africa. As the frontier of science moves out -
ward and the ability of institutions to engineer
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5  Most of Africa’s potential for added irrigation is also distributed unevenly, in just four large countries (Angola, Democratic Republic of
the Congo, Mozambique, and Zambia). Yet these are countries with relatively abundant rainfed land, where irrigation tends to be less
needed. The countries of the Sahel, which desperately need more watered farming land, have scant additional irrigation potential.responses to natural constraints expands, climate no
longer has to be destiny. Africa could be doing
much better in working against these natural con -
straints if governments in the region were willing to
invest more in essential public goods such agricul -
tural research and rural infrastructure. We have seen
that public research and development expenditures
can raise productivity in almost any environment
(Masters and Wiebe 2000). Economic returns to
agricultural research tend to be high; even in Africa
rates of return above 50 percent are not unusual. Yet
most governments in the region have long skimped
on public spending for agricultural science (Alston,
Pardey, and Roseboom 1998). Investments in rural
infrastructure can also increase farm productivity
(Antle 1983), but once again Africa’s governments
have tended to put priorities elsewhere. 
Africa does not have to wait for dramatic
research breakthroughs. There is today consider -
able potential on much of the continent to increase
farm productivity simply by increased use of con -
ventional inputs, such as fertilizer. This could be
achieved with improved delivery of essential public
goods such as rural roads, education, agricultural
research, and conflict reduction (Wiebe, Soule, and
Schimmelpfennig 1998). It is the undersupply of
public goods such as these, rather than any inher -
ent soil or climate constraint, that has most con -
strained farm productivity in Africa, thus compro -
mising the food security of the rural poor.
National Governance
Deficits in Africa 
Despite serious soil and climate constraints, low farm
productivity and the persistence of hunger and food
insecurity in Sub-Saharan Africa must, at some point,
be understood as a failure of governance at the
national level.  Many governments in the region fail
to provide essential public goods such as civil peace,
rule of law, and investments in public infrastructure,
services, and research.
6So long as these essential
public goods remain underprovided by national gov -
ernments in Africa, remedial efforts by others—
including governments of countries outside of Africa,
NGOs, MNCs, and IGOs—will have limited impact.
When measuring good governance, surprisingly
few analysts focus directly on public goods provi -
sion. Some focus on larger values such as the
degree of freedom guaranteed to society, indicated
by the adoption of basic democratic practices (for
example, as surveyed by Freedom House in its
“Freedom in the World” ratings). Others focus more
narrowly on degrees of political risk to private
investors (as in the country risk reviews prepared
quarterly by Standard and Poor’s DRI) or on the
level of perceived governmental corruption (meas -
ured by the Corruption Perceptions Index prepared
by Transparency International). Some of these meas -
ures derive not from objective indicators of actual
governmental performance but instead from subjec -
tive responses to expert or citizen survey question -
naires, and such reputational measures always risk
being influenced by a respondent’s prior knowl -
edge of what others believe, or by prior knowledge
of good or bad economic and political outcomes.
States with good reputations or good economic out -
comes often get high subjective ratings for gover -
nance whether they deserve them or not. 
Whatever the measure being used, the scores
for good governance that emerge in Africa tend to
be extremely low. This is one finding from an
Aggregated Governance Indicator technique devel -
oped by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton
(1999), which uses a variety of survey sources to
construct aggregate indicators of bureaucratic qual -
ity, rule of law, and graft, for a large sample of
160 countries. When African governments were
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6  Some of the public goods needed for food security in Africa today go well beyond the traditional and cannot be covered ade -
quately here. Public health services fall into this category, given the magnitude of Africa's HIV/AIDS crisis. FAO estimates that in
the 25 African nations most affected by HIV/AIDS, 7 million agricultural workers have already died from AIDS-related complica -
tions since 1985. Those countries could lose an additional 16 million farm workers to AIDS by 2020. At current rates of infection,
nearly a quarter of Africa’s agricultural workers could be sick or die from AIDS or related complications within the next 20 years
(Future Harvest 2001).measured in 1997–98 alongside other govern -
ments using this method, they compared unfavor -
ably. African countries constituted 26 percent of all
states sampled, yet they made up 43 percent of the
states that fell into the lowest quintile in terms of gov -
ernance, and they constituted only 3 percent of
those that fell into the highest quintile. 
Good governance in Africa may be scarce rel -
ative to other regions, but by some measures it is at
least increasing. The number of Sub-Saharan
African countries rated as “free” by Freedom House
increased between 1990 and 2000 from only 2 to
8, and the number of “partly free” countries
increased from 15 to 24. Meanwhile, the number
of “nonfree” countries in the region declined from
26 to 13 (Wolgin 2001). Peaceful transfers of
power took place over the past decade in a num -
ber of African countries, including Senegal, Ghana,
South Africa, and Zambia. If constitutional gover -
nance continues to spread to more states in Africa,
public policies could become more accountable to
the rural poor and more public goods essential to
rural income growth might be provided. 
In addition to democracy and constitutionalism,
another measure recently offered as an indicator of
good governance is decentralization. To be respon -
sive to the needs of local communities, particularly
those that are rural and remote, government offi -
cials may have to deliver social services from more
than just a single, central location in the capital city.
Despite the rural and highly dispersed nature of
most communities in Africa, national governments
there are among the most centralized in the world.
Local government employees in Africa constitute just
10 percent of all government employees, only half
the typical ratio in Latin America or Asia (UNDP
1993). In terms of service delivery, governments in
Africa also tend to be highly urbanized. In one
study of 19 developing countries, including six
countries from Sub-Saharan Africa, four of the five
most urbanized countries in terms of service deliv -
ery were African (Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina
Faso, and Senegal), while the seven most decen -
tralized service-delivery countries were all non-
African (Tuskegee University 2001).
Indirect measures of good governance such as
these can be useful, but to advance our present argu -
ment we must return to the issue of public goods
provision. Consider four public goods of par ticular
importance to agricultural productivity growth  and
rural poverty reduction: internal peace, rule of law,
rural infrastructure, and agricultural research. Na-
tional governments in Africa have too often faltered
in their efforts to provide these basic public goods.
Internal peace
Poverty reduction through agricultural productivity
growth is difficult in Africa partly due to the failure
of so many governments in the region to preserve
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Table 10—Global distribution of good governance
Governance quintiles
Share of  2nd 2nd
Region/Country sample Lowest Lowest Middle Highest Highest
(percent) (percent of quintile)
OECD countries 14.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.7 65.7
Non-OECD countries
East Asia 3.4 0.0 2.9 2.9 2.9 8.6
Sub-Saharan Africa 25.9 42.9 32.4 38.2 14.3 2.9
Middle East and North Africa 10.9 14.3 5.9 11.8 25.7 0.0
South and Southeast Asia 10.9 14.3 17.6 8.8 14.3 0.0
Europe and Central Asia 19.5 22.9 20.6 14.7 17.1 14.3
Latin America and the Caribbean 14.9 5.7 20.6 23.5 20.0 8.6
Source:Data from Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (1999) as presented in Wolgin (2001, Part 6, 17).internal peace. Violent conflict reduces agricultural
productivity and compromises secure access to
food in multiple obvious ways. In rural farming com -
munities, the recruitment of able-bodied young men
into armies and militias first takes labor away from
food production thereby reducing rural incomes. In
areas of conflict, predatory activities by both mili -
tias and regular armies then diminish food avail -
ability and access directly. These armed groups
tend to subsist by eating whatever they can take
from the unarmed rural population, and they are
frequently motivated to destroy any food they can -
not use immediately in contested areas, so as to
deny it to their adversaries. Fearing theft and
destruction of this kind, rural dwellers naturally
chose to invest less energy in farming. They may
leave their land entirely and begin moving as inter -
nally displaced people toward cities or emergency
feeding centers set up by relief agencies.
For all these reasons, countries experiencing
conflict in Africa also tend to experience a signifi -
cant drop in food production. They produce on
average 12.4 percent less food per capita in war
years than in peacetime. A comparison of actual
historical food production in Africa after 1980 to a
“peace adjusted trend” shows that peace would
have added 2–5 percent to the continent’s total
food production per year (Messer, Cohen, and
d’Costa 1998).
Violent internal conflicts have been common in
many African states since independence from colo -
nial rule four decades ago. Over the past three
decades, 13 of the world’s 20 worst violent military
conflicts were in African states (Easterly and Levine
1994). Between 1975 and 1995, 12 countries in
Sub-Saharan Africa representing a quarter of the
region’s population were war-torn, usually for pro -
longed periods (Freeman and Lindauer 1999). At
one point in 1993, a 17-year civil war was still under
way in Angola; a three-sided military conflict was
being fought in Liberia; a tenuous peace that fol -
lowed a 16-year civil war was only beginning to take
hold in Mozambique; a long-standing violent conflict
between Hutu and Tutsi was again raging in Rwanda
(soon to produce a tragic genocide in 1994); more
than 230,000 refugees were fleeing fighting in Togo;
rebels in the mostly Christian and animist south of
Sudan were fighting the Muslim-dominated govern -
ment; and U.S. forces had just entered Somalia to
protect food relief shipments from violent attack in
that country’s civil war. The level of violence has mod -
erated only slightly in the years since. As of 2001,
serious military conflicts were still ongoing in Angola,
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone,
Sudan, and Uganda.
Because of military conflict, many Africans are
forced to cross national borders and become
refugees, living in camps and depending for their
survival on international food aid. For those who
are internally displaced, food security can be even
more tenuous, since these people are often cut off
from access to international assistance. Sub-
Saharan Africa accounts for only 10 percent of the
world’s population, yet it recently harbored 46 per -
cent of the world’s refugees and persons internally
displaced by war (Haughton 1997).
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What explains such widespread internal vio -
lence in Africa? One enduring source of conflict has
been the mismatch between nation-state boundaries
and the distribution of contending ethnic groups.
State borders in Africa south of the Sahara were
drawn up by European colonial powers (in Berlin in
1885) mostly for the purpose of keeping peace
among Europeans, not among Africans. When the
colonizers finally departed in the 1960s, the
diverse African ethnic groups contained within
these poorly drawn national boundaries naturally
began to struggle to control what the Europeans left
behind, not only the valuable natural resources,
such as diamonds, copper, gold, and petroleum,
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7  In Angola, more than 20 percent of the population was recently internally displaced. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
more than 450,000 are internally displaced. In Sierra Leone, rebel activity has prevented the return of about 500,000 refugees
from Guinea and Liberia and has blocked relief shipments to roughly 500,000 internally displaced people. Sudan continues to have
by far the largest number of internally displaced people due to violent conflict—an estimated 4 million as of 1999 (NIC 1999).but also the potentially valuable political institu-
tions of the state itself. In Africa, where the private
economy is weak, most wealth and power contin -
ues to flow through or be generated by the public
sector, through institutions such as the army, the
police, state-owned companies, job-creating state
bureaucracies, or state agencies empowered to tax
or regulate imports and exports. Resources now
also flow into African states through the finan-
cial, developmental, and diplomatic ministries that
receive foreign assistance from donors or loans
from international financial institutions. Struggles
between contending ethnic groups to gain control
over these wealth-monopolizing institutions often
evolve into violent internal conflict. It is said that
because state institutions control so much in Africa,
“the stakes of politics are too high” (Diamond
1993, 218).
The great diversity of ethnic groups in Africa
would have made the problem of nation-state for -
mation and pacification difficult even if Africans
themselves had drawn their national boundaries.
Fourteen of the fifteen most ethnically diverse soci -
eties in the world are located in Africa.
8By one
count, Sub-Saharan Africa has 74 different ethnic
minorities, compared to only 43 in all of Asia,
where the population is much larger overall (Gurr
1993). In Sub-Saharan Africa, minorities comprise
42 percent of the population, versus the global
average of 17 percent. Ethnopolitical groups in
Africa also tend to have a stronger sense of group
identity than comparable groups elsewhere. Fifty-
seven percent of the African minorities on which
data are available are strong identity groups, ver -
sus the global mean of 37 percent. Much of this
strength in group identity is actually recent in origin,
having emerged under colonial influence or during
anticolonial and postcolonial struggles.
Under these fractious circumstances, asking
governments to provide the public good of internal
peace is certainly asking a great deal. Yet it is
sometimes unlawful behavior by government itself
that triggers the violence. In such cases the public
good of internal peace is linked to a second impor -
tant internal public good: rule of law.
Rule of law
Societies, including rural agricultural societies, need
protection against more than just violent conflict.
They also need safeguards against loss of property
and breeches of contract. Well-functioning national
governments provide such safeguards by operating
capable and noncorrupt civil and criminal justice
systems. Ill-functioning governments may either fail
to provide these safeguards, or in extreme cases,
they themselves may break the law and prey on
their own citizens.
Governments in Africa have often fallen short of
providing secure rule of law to all of their citizens.
Sometimes this is due to governmental breakdown,
as in Somalia which has been without a function-
ing central government since 1991. In other cases,
rule of law may be compromised when a govern -
ment loses control over significant portions of its
territory. For example, in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, Sierra Leone, and Liberia the cen-
tral government is capable of maintaining order in
only relatively small portions of the country. Armed
opposition groups or intervening foreign armies
dominate elsewhere. Rule of law can also be com -
promised by unconstitutional political interventions
by military leaders. Or a government may drift
away from constitutional rule under the leader-
ship of a corrupt entrenched party organization, or
a single dominating leader (often the founding
president). “Rule by the party” or “rule by the
leader” often degenerates into predatory gover -
nance, where the power of the state is employed
narrowly and unconstitutionally to enrich the
leader’s family, friends, and ethnic compatriots, or
to keep political rivals at bay. Public resources then
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8  Easterly and Levine (1994, 12) use a measure of ethnic diversity based on the probability that two randomly selected individuals
in a society will belong to different ethnolinguistic groups. The only non-African society on this list is India.become, in Richard Joseph’s words, “a national
cake to be divided and subdivided among office -
holders” (Joseph 1996: 195).
9
The tendency in Africa toward rule-by-the-leader
rather than rule of law has been difficult to over -
come, even in cases where elections are initiated.
Between 1989 and 1999, 18 African countries
seemed to be moving toward democratization in the
sense that they moved up at least one category in
the rating system used by Freedom House. Yet
despite elections, a disturbing number of entrenched
African chief executives held on to their office and
control of the state. As of 1996, there were still only
two African countries (Botswana and Mauritius) with
enough free electoral history to be classified as fully
democratic (Derbyshire and Derbyshire 1996).
Another indicator of weak rule of law in Africa
is government corruption. Since 1995 the private
organization Transparency International has ranked
countries according to the degree of corruption that
is perceived to exist among public officials and
politicians. The ranking uses surveys that capture
the perceptions of business people, the general pub -
lic, and country analysts. Countries get a score from
0 to 10, where a score of 0 means highly corrupt
and a score of 10 means highly clean.
10Transpar-
ency International’s rankings confirm African gov -
ernments’ reputation for being less likely to enforce
rule of law than governments in other developing-
country regions. The average index score of the
18 African countries ranked by Transparency
International in 2000 was 3.0. By comparison, the
11 Latin American countries ranked had the higher
average score of 3.9 and the 10 non–OECD Asian
countries ranked had the even higher average
score of 4.3.
11
Another indirect measure of how well African
governments provide rule of law can be found in
the Index of Economic Freedom compiled yearly by
the Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal.
One dimension this index measures is the protection
of property rights, defined as security from govern -
ment expropriation, the presence of an efficient
court system to enforce contracts, and a justice sys -
tem that punishes those who unlawfully confiscate
private property. Using information gathered by the
Economist Intelligence Unit, the U.S. Department of
Commerce, and the U.S. Department of State, this
index ranks 155 countries according to the degree
of protection they offer to property rights. Scores
range from 1 (strongest protection) to 5 (weakest
protection). Of the 36 Sub-Saharan African coun -
tries ranked in 2001, none had a score of 1, five
had a score of 2, 13 had a score of 3, and the
remaining 18 had scores of 4 or higher, resulting in
a regional average of 3.5. This high average score
would have been far worse if coverage had been
given to those countries in Africa that were ex-
periencing full internal breakdown and violent con -
flict. Six such countries were not even ranked in
2001 (Angola, Burundi, Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan) be-
cause of “the unreliability of available data caused
by political instability, outright civil war, or lack of
central government” (O’Driscoll, Holmes, and
Kirkpatrick 2001, 4).
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10  Transparency International uses a composite index to rank countries and it builds this index only for countries on which it has
data from a minimum of three recent independent surveys. The 2000 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) ranks 90 countries based
on surveys conducted in 1998–2000. See <http://www.glogalcorruptionreport.org/>
11  Some individual Latin American and Asian governments (for example, Indonesia, Viet Nam, Ecuador, Venezuela, Bolivia, the
Philippines, and India) had lower corruption index scores than the African average, and the transitional states of the former Soviet
Union had the lowest average index scores. Yet the index of perceived corruption provides more evidence that African states have
difficulty supplying rule of law as a national public good.
9  Wolgin (2001, 17) describes this pattern as follows:
African states became characterized by the identification of the leader and his party with the nation-state itself,
ethnic tension, lack of a coherent national vision, the use of the state to dispense political favors, the expansion
of the state’s role beyond its administrative capacity, and the erosion of the professionalism of the civil service.
Without a tradition of strong institutions of accountability, it became commonplace in many countries for both
politicians and bureaucrats to use the power they controlled to enrich themselves.Weak property protection in Africa is particu -
larly important as a key to understanding the per -
sistence of slow economic growth in the region.
Economic growth in Africa would be higher if the
level of investment were higher. But the incentive to
invest is weak because essential public goods such
as peace, property protection, and contract
enforcement are so often missing. One of the few
African countries to provide strong guarantees of
property protection to foreign investors, Botswana,
has attracted one of the highest rates of FDI per
capita on the continent. This is no accident.
Botswana has the lowest “political risk” of any
nation in Sub-Saharan Africa, including South
Africa, as revealed in surveys of risk analysts, risk
insurance brokers, and bank credit officers
(Coolidge and Rose-Ackerman 2001).
It is significant that Africans as well as non-
Africans have been reluctant to invest in the region.
A study by Collier and Gunning (1997) compares
the portfolio choices of wealth holders across all
regions, using data on capital flight and domestic
capital stocks. They find that wealth owners in Africa
relocated 37 percent of their wealth outside the con -
tinent. This compares to a 17 percent capital flight
rate in Latin America and only 3 percent in East
Asia. It leads Collier and Gunning to conclude that
if Africa reduced its own total capital flight to the
level of Asia, its capital stock might increase by half.
When war, government corruption, and weak
property protection discourage new investment,
gains will be limited even if government perform -
ance improves in other areas. African governments
have improved their performance in some policy
areas recently, including macroeconomic policy and
public education. With regard to macroeconomic
policy, partly because of better public spending dis -
ciplines, inflation in the region has fallen from an
average 13.6 percent in 1980 to 8.4 percent in
1997. Reduced inflation is an important public
good, especially for the poor who tend to hold their
assets in cash (Wolgin 2001). In recent decades,
African governments have also made substantial
investments in primary and secondary public edu -
cation. Between 1970 and 1992 the primary school
enrollment rate in Africa increased from 50 to
72 percent, and the secondary school enrollment
rate increased from 7 to 24 percent (Freeman and
Lindauer 1999). Yet economic growth has remained
disappointing, and per capita income in many
African countries has continued to decline. In 1995,
83 percent of Africans lived in countries with a
per capita income below the level that prevailed
15 years earlier, in 1980. As population has grown,
the total number of the poor (and hence hungry) in
Africa has grown as well. Between 1990 and 1998
the number of people living in poverty in Africa
increased from 242 million to 291 million.
Why hasn’t Africa experienced the economic
growth that so many other developing regions have
experienced? Freeman and Lindauer argue that
there is a natural ordering to the determinants of
economic growth, and political stability and prop -
erty rights protections come first.
Without this base, investments in education, open -
ness, and levels of income equality have little effect
on growth. The reason returns to schooling are low
in Africa, that capital flight is high, and that the shift
toward free trade has not created growth miracles
is that schooling, investment, and trade operate suc-
cessfully only in a peaceful, stable, environment for
economic activity (Freeman and Lindauer 1999, 20).
Rural infrastructure 
Throughout the developing world, the deep poverty
of rural areas tends to be associated with a lack of
infrastructure to ensure access to markets and fun -
damental public services including water and sani -
tation, education, and public health. Data from one
survey covering 55,500 households in 15 different
countries (African and non-African) reveal the mag -
nitude of several important rural-urban infrastructure
gaps. Compared with urban households, fewer
rural households had electricity (46 versus 89 per -
cent), in-house water taps (12 versus 59 percent),
sewer connections (7 versus 61 percent), and tele -
phones (8 versus 38 percent). Given this pervasive
lack of rural infrastructure, it is unsurprising that
when the sample of households in this survey was
broken down by wealth, more than 91 percent of
those in the poorest quintile were living in rural set -
tings. Among these lowest quintile rural dwellers,
infrastructure coverage was even weaker than the
overall rural average. Almost none of these poorest
rural households had in-house water (2 percent),
35sewers (1 percent), or telephones (2 percent). Even
for the less impoverished rural households—those
with incomes up to $2,400 per year—coverage of
these basic public services remained under 10 per -
cent (Komives, Whittington, and Wu 2001).
In Africa, one rural infrastructure deficit es-
pecially prejudicial to agricultural productivity
and rural income growth is the shortage of well-
maintained or paved rural roads. Total road cover -
age in Africa is sparse, with only 0.06 kilometers of
roads per square kilometer, compared with a den -
sity three times higher in Latin America and six times
higher in Asia (Wolgin 2001). Of this scant road
coverage in Africa, very little is paved to ensure
passability during the rainy season. Paved roads
comprise only 7 percent of total road coverage in
Uganda, and in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo the paved share is just 2 percent. The paved
and unpaved roads that do exist in Africa also
tend to be poorly maintained. At a given time,
50–90 percent of Africa’s rural roads are in need
of repair (Calvo 1998). Partly because Africa’s
rural transport infrastructure includes so few paved
roads suitable for vehicles (or even bicycles), 87 per -
cent of all household travel is still by foot.
A farm productivity revolution will be difficult to
launch in Africa as long as transport costs remain
high due to the underdeveloped rural transport
infrastructure. High costs of transport impede farm -
ers from getting needed inputs (such as fertilizer) at
an affordable price. Fertilizer costs 2–6 times more
at the farm gate in Africa than in Asia, Europe, or
North America. High transport costs also reduce the
ability of farmers to sell their produce for higher
prices in cities. Marketing costs for agricultural
products are higher in Africa than anywhere else in
the world, and this hurts the rural poor both as sell -
ers and buyers of food. Many poor households are
actually net purchasers of food, using the small
incomes they gain from cash-crop production or
remittances. High rural transport costs also tend to
constrain rural credit availability and severely
reduce the growth of nonfarm employment as a sup -
plementary income option in the countryside.
Africa’s poorly developed rural transport infra -
structure is particularly damaging to the interests of
rural women, since it is they who traditionally bear
the larger share of transport burdens. Throughout
Sub-Saharan Africa, women contribute at least
65 percent of the household time spent on travel
and transport and well over 65 percent of the effort.
African women learn from an early age how to
head-carry heavy loads (sometimes exceeding their
body weight) over remarkable distances. Surveys
conducted in rural Zambia, Uganda, and Burkina
Faso indicate that the carrying burden (measured in
ton-kilometers per person per year) taken on by
women in rural Africa tends to be almost four times
greater than the burden taken on by men (World
Bank 1997). The physical burden on these women
could be eased and rural transport efficiency dra -
matically improved through larger public invest -
ments in a rural transport infrastructure, especially
feeder roads capable of taking vehicles and bicy -
cles into remote rural communities. 
Adequate public investments in rural transport
infrastructure have been critical to farm productivity
growth in other developing-country regions, most
notably in China and Taiwan. Rural roads not only
open new areas for production, they also increase
labor efficiency (Craig, Pardey, and Roseboom
1997). Investments in rural roads are nonetheless
meager in much of Africa, in part because the phys -
ical dispersion of the population often renders road
projects nonviable once economic rate of return cri -
teria are calculated. Such traditional economic cri -
teria can, unfortunately, be blind to parallel con -
cerns such as social and gender equity and
absolute poverty reduction, which are also key to
the reduction of rural hunger. If more criteria high -
lighting social benefits to the poor were taken into
account, rural infrastructure investments might
emerge as cost-effective even in some of Africa’s
most sparsely populated areas. The rural poor in
Africa also can benefit from the process of road
construction and maintenance through the creation
of local wage employment (Liu and Gannon 1999). 
Agricultural research and extension
Governments in Africa have also fallen short in pro -
viding adequate public investments in agricultural
research. We earlier discussed the role of the
CGIAR in providing global public goods in the
36research area, but the CGIAR cannot do the job
alone. Without competent teams of agricultural sci -
entists at the national level able to adapt CGIAR
crop varieties and innovations for local use and
respond to local needs, the breakthroughs made at
the international centers are likely to sit unused.
Research contributions from national scientists may
actually be more important in the African setting
than in other developing-country regions, given
Africa’s distinctly difficult agroclimatic environment
plus the lower involvement of private-sector research
enterprises in Africa (Johnson and Evenson 2000).
During the Green Revolution in Asia, strong
national agricultural research programs within the
adopting countries were critical to move improved
traits into local germplasm and to move the new
seeds out to farms. Yet since the 1980s, many
proven national programs have struggled due to a
lack of public funds. IFPRI’s 2020 Vision initiative,
since 1995, has advised low-income developing
countries to set an immediate minimum target for
spending on agricultural research equal to 1 per -
cent of the value of total agricultural output, with a
longer term (5–10 year) target level of 2 percent
(IFPRI 1995, 29). Unfortunately, most governments
in low-income developing countries have spent only
about 0.5 percent of their agricultural GDP on agri -
cultural research. A few middle-income developing
countries, such as Malaysia and Thailand, have
spent 0.6–0.7 percent, with other less wealthy
countries, such as Pakistan and the Philippines,
spending only about 0.2 percent.
Governments in Africa have also skimped in
funding agricultural development more broadly.
Most have invested less than 5 percent of their
annual budget in any kind of agricultural devel-
opment, even though up to 75 percent of their
citizens—and an even larger share of their poorest
citizens—still depend on farming. These small agri -
cultural development budgets leave little room for
research. Since the 1980s, research spending in
Africa increased at only a sluggish 0.8 percent
annual rate, well below the 2.5 percent annual
increase registered in the 1970s when agriculture
still received high priority from a number of gov -
ernments (Alston, Pardey, and Roseboom 1998).
Between 1971 and 1991, in 44 Sub-Saharan
African countries public expenditures on research
and development for agriculture increased by only
35 percent, versus a 166 percent average increase
in all 131 developing countries together (Pardey et
al. 1999 cited in Tuskegee University 2001). This
was at a time when Africa’s population was roughly
doubling and food production per capita was stag -
nating. It is thus unsurprising that Africa has only
42 agricultural researchers per million persons eco -
nomically active in agriculture, compared with
2,458 in industrial countries.
Of course the donor community is in part to
blame for this underinvestment in research. Agri-
cultural research in Africa has long been heavily
dependent on donor funds—traditionally 61 per -
cent is donor funded in francophone countries and
36 percent in anglophone countries outside of
South Africa. When donor funding declines, as it
did in the 1990s, national governments find it hard
to make up the difference. Yet the donor com-
munity cannot be expected to carry the burden
on its own. Since 1981 the World Bank has lent
$3.8 billion for agricultural research purposes in
develop ing countries, either through specialized
agricultural research loans or broader loans with an
agricultural research component. Over the same
period, the World Bank also provided roughly
$3 billion in direct support for agricultural exten-
sion in the developing world. Yet these global
investments in agricultural knowledge creation and
public dissemination have not been matched by
sufficient public investments by governments in the
poor countries themselves.
37When governments fail to deliver the minimum
public goods needed to provide food security for
their own citizens, what can be done to correct the
resulting governance deficit? To what extent can
national governments in rich countries, or IGOs, or
perhaps national or international NGOs step in
to provide the public goods and services that
local national governments fail to supply? This
section provides some illustrative answers, once
again focusing primarily on the difficult case of Sub-
Saharan Africa. We specifically ask how gover -
nance deficits might be corrected in such areas
as internal peace, rule of law, and investment in
research and rural infrastructure. Where opportuni -
ties exist for outsiders to provide more help, their
obligation to do so rises accordingly.
Can Outsiders Restore and
Preserve Internal Peace? 
International norms and laws of state sovereignty
have traditionally restricted the freedom of outsiders
to intervene in the internal affairs of foreign states,
even when those states fail to provide their own cit -
izens with internal peace. This norm of noninter -
vention has been useful for protecting weak states
from domination or conquest by the strong, so it has
traditionally been defended most vociferously by
the leaders of weak states, and it has been written
into the charters of many state membership IGOs,
including the United Nations and various regional
organizations. In Africa, when the Organization of
African Unity (OAU) was founded in 1963, the con -
tinent’s new leaders agreed before all else on the
impermissibility of outside intervention into the
“internal affairs” of member states.
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The traditional norm against intervention has
recently weakened a bit, with the colonial era
receding into history and then with the end of the
Cold War. As national independence has become
more secure over time and as the danger of com -
petitive Cold War superpower interventions less -
ened, new political space has opened to permit
more frequent peacekeeping and international
humanitarian interventions. Beginning in the
1980s, the U.N. Security Council became more
active in authorizing interventions into the internal
affairs of states, as it was no longer paralyzed by a
veto-casting competition between the United States
and Russia. The Security Council has increasingly
authorized interventions in at least three important
circumstances: when a state engages in systematic
human rights violations, when a state is incapable
of protecting human rights due to a breakdown in
state authority, and when a government in power is
unlawfully constituted. When these conditions are
present, the Security Council has become more will -
ing to consider the situation a threat to peace, and
it has exercised its legal powers to authorize inter -
national enforcement measures under Chapter VII
of the U.N. Charter.
This weakening of the state sovereignty norm has
unfortunately not yet been accompanied by any sig -
nificant strengthening of the institutional or military
capacity of legitimate international institutions (such
as the Security Council) to carry out enforcement
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12  In 2001 the OAU changed its name to the African Union (AU).actions to preserve or restore internal peace. For the
purpose of peace preservation, it remains extremely
difficult for the Security Council or the secretary-
general to authorize an intervention prior to an
actual outbreak of violence. A former special repre -
sentative of the United Nations in Somalia,
Mohamed Sahnoun, has described at length his frus -
tration in seeing several opportune moments for pre -
ventive diplomatic intervention pass in that country
between 1988 and 1991, leaving the country to
spiral into anarchy, clan violence, and finally a wide -
spread famine. Sahnoun largely faults the weak
institutional structure and capacity of the U.N. system
itself (Sahnoun 1994). 
On other occasions the weak capacity of the
United Nations to operate independent of the pref -
erences of great powers has blocked timely peace-
preserving interventions. A mission from the U.N.
Department of Peacekeeping Operations recom -
mended that an international peacekeeping force
of 8,000 troops be stationed in Rwanda in 1993.
But this recommendation was blocked by the U.S.
delegation, which had become fearful of partici -
pating in U.N. peacekeeping operations since the
deaths of 18 U.S. soldiers in a belated effort to
restore peace by intervention in Somalia.
Consequently the Security Council sent only a small
2,500-troop force to Rwanda in 1993, a force with
no budget, no intelligence capacity, only one func -
tioning armored personnel carrier, and rules of
engagement that were strictly reactive. When sub -
sequently attacked by contending forces in
Rwanda’s internal political war in the spring of
1994, this token force simply withdrew, clearing the
way for resumption of an internal war that was
marked by genocidal violence, massive population
dislocations, and again famine (Jones 1999).
As currently constructed, IGOs such as the
United Nations are also poorly equipped to restore
peace after internal fighting breaks out. Once hos -
tilities are under way, the international community
has usually intervened only for the purpose of
extracting foreign nationals from physical danger or
delivering emergency relief. International assistance
agencies and NGOs often attempt humanitarian
interventions to deliver food and medical relief to
the victims of war, but while fighting persists these
interventions, too, are prone to failure. In Somalia
after violence broke out early in 1992, up to 80 per -
cent of the food aid delivered to the country was
routinely stolen by armed militias.
Discussions continue within the international
community over the legal and institutional innova -
tions that might be required to empower the United
Nations to conduct successful peace preservation
and restoration missions within sovereign states, in
Africa or elsewhere. Several proposals could be
acted on quickly, if the secretary-general were to
take the lead with support from the permanent mem -
bers of the Security Council. Without having to
amend the Charter or alter the power or compo-
sition of the Security Council, the United Nations
might be able to provide more effective interna-
tional preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping if
five conditions were met: 
￿ If the secretary-general were to exercise more
often his authority under Article 99 to “bring to
the attention of the Security Council any matter
which in his opinion may threaten the mainte -
nance of international peace and security.”
￿ If the General Assembly were to exercise more
often its right to address problems that the
Security Council is avoiding.
￿ If larger national contributions were made to
the Fund for Preventive Action (established by
Norway in 1996), which provides the secretary-
general with resources to train, support, and ex-
pand a roster of people to serve as envoys and
special representatives in real or suspected crises.
￿ If contributing member governments gave the
secretary-general and Security Council more
capacity to react quickly to imminent con-
flicts, in the form of rapid-reaction and standby
military forces on call for U.N. duty. Member
states—particularly nonsuperpowers—could
designate forces from their own military ser-
vices as dedicated to the support of such rapid-
reaction missions. 
￿ If the secretary-general and Security Council
had authority over a small standing police force
for internal conflict prevention purposes.
Conflict prevention policing actions are often
best carried out with trained police rather than
regular army troops. Yet police personnel are
39seldom in ready surplus among member coun -
tries. A standing force under U.N. control could
be necessary to ensure timely action (Smith and
Naim 2000).
It will strike some as potentially dangerous to
give the admittedly nondemocratic and frequently
nonaccountable institutions of the United Nations
any increased capacity to violate traditional norms
of sovereignty in the name of preventive diplomacy
or internal peace preservation. Yet the only alter-
native, until now, has been to leave this task by
default to disproportionately powerful individual
states (sometimes states with hegemonic or neo -
colonial ambitions) or to ad hoc alliances of such
states, sometimes with Security Council endorse -
ment and sometimes without. This evolving ad
hoc intervention system has not prevented internal
wars or mischievous foreign interventions (in Africa,
witness the multiple international military interven -
tions recently in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo). Institutionalizing a stronger intervention
capacity within the U.N. system might thus be
the only way to preempt even less desirable inter -
ventions. Moreover, an increased likelihood that
the Security Council will act might deter some of
the worst internal excesses in the first place. As
Secretary-General Kofi Annan re-marked in his
1999 annual report on the work of the United
Nations, “Even the most repressive leaders watch to
see what they can get away with…. The more the
international community succeeds in altering their
destructive calculus, the more lives can be saved”
(cited in Smith and Naim 2000).
Some institutional innovations within Africa
itself might increase prospects for internal peace.
Governments in the region could experiment with
institutional arrangements that depart from the uni -
fied territorial nation-state model left to them by the
European colonizers. In some cases, the diversity of
Africa’s many contending ethnolinguistic minority
groups might better be accommodated—and
peace better preserved—through national gover -
nance institutions designed to grant explicit regional
autonomy, shared powers, or conditional rights of
secession to some regions or groups. Such innova -
tive constitutional redesigns may be difficult to
undertake, with international legitimacy now con -
ferred so exclusively on individual leaders of tradi -
tional unified states, via diplomatic recognition, IGO
membership, and access to public-sector interna -
tional borrowing privileges or financial support.
Because of such international benefits, some
African politicians may find it more advantageous
to rule a unified state torn by war than to innovate
an internal division or sharing of power in the inter -
ests of peace (Herbst 2001).
We may ask if promoting democracy is a way
to build internal peace in Africa. Promoting democ -
racy may be good for advancing the rule of law
once states are free of violent conflict, as we shall
argue below. But movement toward highly central -
ized majoritarian democratic systems in ethnolin -
guistically divided countries can be dangerous if
peace has not yet been secured. As Timothy Sisk
argues, “Simple majoritarian democracy contains
special problems for ethnically divided societies.
Minority ethnic groups expect to be permanently
excluded from power through the ballot box and
fear electoral contests when the principle of simple
majority rule is operative” (1996, ix). Particularly in
societies that have recently experienced internal vio -
lence, competitive winner-take-all elections contest -
ed along ethnic or regional divisions may be an
unlikely path to peace and national unity.
Can Outsiders Promote
Rule of Law?
The norm of state sovereignty can also block out -
siders from promoting rule of law. Yet the poor and
the hungry would seem entitled to some external
help, particularly where a government has become
predatory against its own people. How can out -
siders work against the tendency of regimes in so
many states to impose arbitrary taxes, steal state
funds, appropriate private property, and fail to pun -
ish crimes or enforce contracts? In societies not too
badly divided by ethnic conflict, international efforts
to promote democracy can play a positive role.
Genuinely competitive elections carrying a signifi -
cant threat of electoral removal can be a strong pro -
tection against entrenched and corrupt regimes.
Democratic competition is one reason for
Botswana’s relative success in maintaining a rule-of-
40law approach toward public affairs (Coolidge and
Rose-Ackerman 2001). 
Outsiders concerned with rule of law in Africa
sometimes hesitate to call for the full democratization
of political systems in the region, knowing that such
a stance might compromise their various diplomatic
or economic relationships with nondemocratic
regime leaders. In deference to the norm of state
sovereignty, international financial institutions such
as the World Bank are actually proscribed from con -
ditioning their loans on the adoption of any one spe -
cific form of government. Until now most interna -
tional institutions have been willing only to seek
greater discipline over the most extreme outcomes of
nondemocratic rule, such as human rights abuses or
state corruption. For example, efforts are now being
made by outsiders to reduce bribe-taking by officials
in the developing world. These efforts have been
pursued most energetically by NGOs such as Trans-
parency International and the International Chamber
of Commerce, now supported by IGOs like the
Organization of American States and the Common-
wealth Heads of Government. The conditioned lend -
ing activities of key international financial institutions
such as the World Bank and IMF have also played
a role (Commonwealth Secretariat 2000).
External efforts to reduce bribe-taking in poor
countries are no doubt useful to the international pri -
vate sector, yet agricultural productivity and food
security in Africa is more often compromised by
other rule-of-law deficits, such as a general failure to
enforce private contracts, or the outright appropria -
tion by the state (often by rulers, their family or their
supporters) of private lands or wealth. External inter -
ventions to prevent this sort of governance failure
are routinely avoided by the international commu -
nity, partly because they are hard to justify under
current international law.
It is an irony that Africa’s one-man rule regimes
are protected from international interventions for
good governance purposes, given the frequency of
international interventions over the years to prop up
such regimes. Some of these interventions were
Cold War motivated, as in the case of U.S. support
for the anticommunist but disastrous Mobutu regime
in Zaire. In some cases the external intrusions reveal
postcolonial motivations as one-man regimes in
Africa have often been given foreign economic and
military aid by former metropolitan governments for
the dubious purpose of preserving diplomatic influ -
ence or exclusive commercial access. External inter -
ventions that sustain one-man rule in Africa also
come inadvertently from international financial insti -
tutions such as the IMF and World Bank. When
IGOs such as these extend loans to struggling
African governments, they breathe political life into
the failed nondemocratic leaders of such regimes.
Without the legitimacy gained through international
diplomatic recognition and representation, and
without the intergovernmental lending and assis -
tance automatically enjoyed as a result, some failed
governments in Africa might be easier to replace
(Clapham 1996).
Some of this international support for one-man
rule in Africa weakened when the Cold War
ended, and more political space is now open for
appropriate international scrutiny and criticism. For
example, when the U.S. Secretary of State visited
Africa in May 2001, he directly asked the president
of Zimbabwe (who had headed the country as
either president or prime minister for more than two
decades) and the president of Kenya (who had
ruled the country as a one-party state for nearly as
long) to step aside and allow new presidents to be
elected. In the case of Zimbabwe, outsiders have
also frozen most economic assistance pending
improved governance.
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A mix of outside pressure and assistance might
help move more of Africa (or states in equally non -
democratic regions, such as the Middle East)
41
13  While regime leaders naturally resist such external pressure, ordinary Africans do not seem to be offended. In Zimbabwe, where
two decades of one-man rule finally brought the nation a shrinking economy, 60 percent unemployment, and state violence against
the organized democratic opposition, one opinion survey conducted by the Helen Suzman Foundation found that only 2 percent of
all citizens thought whites were most to blame for Zimbabwe’s problems, while 41 percent blamed the president’s government and
28 percent blamed the president himself (Johnson 2001).toward political systems grounded in rule of law or
competitive elections. Explicit bilateral pressure by
influential states can produce results over time.
Consider the dramatic shift toward democracy that
took place in Latin America between 1974 and
1990, in part because of bilateral pressures
imposed from the United States. In 1974, when the
United States shifted the focus of its diplomacy in
Latin America (mostly at congressional insistence) in
the direction of advocating democracy, eight out of
the ten states in South America had nondemocratic
governments. Sixteen years later, in 1990, nine of
these same ten states had governments that were
democratically chosen (Huntington 1991).
This transformation was partly the result of con -
sistently strong diplomatic pressures applied in the
region by United States, most obviously during the
presidency of Jimmy Carter (1977–80). These pres -
sures included official statements endorsing democ -
ratization, the publication of annual ratings of
human rights protection in individual countries by
the U.S. Department of State, direct advocacy
through the U.S. Information Agency, economic
pressures and sanctions (for example, congression -
al limitations on assistance, trade, and investment),
material support for democratic forces, and even
military actions. In 1978 the Carter administration
deployed American warships off the Dominican
Republic to ensure a fair election count, and in
1980, 1983, and 1984 the United States inter -
vened to prevent planned military coups in El
Salvador, Honduras, and Bolivia. In 1989 U.S.
diplomacy prevented a military coup in Peru, and
the United States staged a military invasion of
Panama to reverse a coup against free electoral
processes. External pressures were only part of the
story, to be sure. Longer term demographic trends,
such as the growth of a larger and better informed
urban middle class, plus some key nonstate influ -
ences such as radical Catholic priests promoting a
new “liberation theology,” also helped to banish
traditional authoritarian regimes from the region.
The spread of democracy in Latin America in
the 1970s and 1980s helped to inspire parallel
changes elsewhere, including in Central Europe,
East and Southeast Asia, and even the former
Soviet Union. Sensing the power of this trend, a
number of industrial democratic states in the 1980s
began to incorporate formal democracy promotion
programs into their traditional assistance policies.
At first these programs concentrated narrowly on
electoral assistance, such as funding election
administration projects or sending international
observers to monitor the conduct of elections in tran -
sitional states. Also playing a role in these efforts
were IGOs, including the United Nations (under a
somewhat expanded definition of peacekeeping)
and regional institutions like the Organization of
American States and the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe. When it became clear
that merely holding elections might not be enough,
these external efforts broadened to include a
strengthening and reforming major state institutions
such as legislatures and judiciaries, and the cre -
ation of stronger “civil society” institutions to assist
in holding state institutions to account. Considerable
resources have now gone into such international
democracy promotion assistance programs. In
2000 the U.S. Government devoted more than
$500 million to democracy promotion abroad,
principally through USAID but also through a num -
ber of publicly funded NGOs such as the National
Endowment for Democracy, the Asia Foundation,
and the Eurasia Foundation (Carothers and
Ottaway 2000, 5).
In Africa, international pressures and rewards
for democratization have so far produced mixed
results. In some cases where elections were already
scheduled, such as Zambia, international assis -
tance helped bring an end to an entrenched regime
without any coercion.
14Yet in other cases, such as
Kenya, success has been elusive. In Kenya coercive
diplomatic pressure from the donor community,
including threats to suspend assistance, were
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14  Zambia held multiparty elections in 1991 for the first time since 1968. Western donors strongly supported the elections, and to
ensure their credibility they provided international observers and promoted domestic monitoring efforts. President Kenneth Kaunda,
who had ruled the country since independence, was defeated (Ottaway 2000, 82).required simply to persuade the regime to hold elec -
tions, first in 1992 and then once more in 1997.
These elections did not end entrenched rule, how -
ever, as partisan divisions among the political
opposition enabled the incumbent party to win.
In contrast to Latin America, where U.S. diplo -
matic leadership was an external contributor to the
democratization process, in Africa European lead -
ership will be more critical. European governments
enjoy stronger political and cultural ties to the re-
gion. They have a larger diplomatic presence, and
they are also usually more engaged in terms of cor -
porate investments and bilateral assistance. Within
Africa itself, the government of South Africa has a
crucial leadership role to play. Having recently
secured its own transition to democratic rule, South
Africa has a chance to project greater expectations
of democratic governance onto neighboring states
in the region.
Even with such external pressures and rewards,
Africa’s transition to democratic rule is likely to be
slow and hesitant at best. While awaiting the com -
pletion of that transition, outsiders should help com -
pensate for other public goods deficits in the region,






Intervening from the outside to help bring about
internal peace and rule of law is sensitive and diffi -
cult. But offering help to compensate for deficits in
rural infrastructure and research investment should
be much easier, since this task only requires ade -
quately funded and properly targeted external
assistance. The straightforward challenge is to
mobilize sufficient external resources to make the
additional investments in rural infrastructure and
agricultural research that are needed.
Public assistance is needed because the private
sector is unlikely to get involved. International com -
panies have vast financial and technological
resources, but they are uninterested in investing
those resources in Africa for the creation of public
goods such as rural roads or for research on
improved varieties of subsistence crops for which
there is no commercial seed market. This would be
true even if Africa were peaceful and democratic.
Neither Africans nor outsiders should wait for the
private sector to make these needed investments in
public goods. The international public sector offers
an attractive alternative.
Public-sector assistance to Africa has been sub -
stantial over the years. According to data compiled
by the OECD Development Assistance Committee
(DAC), in 1998–99 Sub-Saharan Africa received a
yearly average of $11.3 billion in net ODA through
bilateral and multilateral channels (OECD 2001,
Table 32). For 1993–97, net ODA receipts in
Africa had totaled $86.5 billion, which was rough -
ly nine times the total net foreign direct investment
of private companies in the region during the same
period (Goldsmith 2001). Africa receives more
ODA than any other developing region in absolute
terms, in per capita terms, and also as a share
of GNP and gross domestic investment. Govern-
ments in Africa have also benefited from repeated
rounds of debt forgiveness. From 1989 to 1997 the
41 Highly Indebted Poor Countries (not all in Africa)
received roughly $33 billion in debt forgiveness
(Easterly 2001). 
Yet much of this public-sector lending, assis -
tance, and foreign debt forgiveness has recently
been linked not to local public goods investments,
but instead to an elusive goal of “policy reform.”
During the world debt crisis of the 1980s, when
many developing-country governments ran out of
money and were forced to turn to the IMF and the
World Bank for emergency loans, the policy advice
they got along with the loans was to embrace a set
of “structural adjustment” policy reforms. These
included not only monetary policy discipline, trade
liberalization, market deregulation, and privatiza -
tion of state-owned enterprises, but also fiscal poli -
cy discipline in the form of reduced public-sector
spending. The World Bank thus began lending not
to expand state investments in poor countries, but
instead to shrink state spending in the name of mar -
ket efficiency and fiscal discipline. During the
1980s, the share of World Bank lending worldwide
43that was invested in agricultural and rural develop -
ment projects fell nearly by half, while the share of
total World Bank lending for the purpose of induc -
ing policy change increased from almost nothing to
more than 20 percent (Lipton and Paarlberg 1990).
The goal was to shrink wasteful public-sector spend -
ing on unneeded consumer and producer subsidies,
inefficient state enterprises, and large state bureau -
cracies. But one unintended side-effect of the struc -
tural adjustment lending strategy was a collateral
shrinkage of spending on much-needed public
goods investments in areas such as rural health,
education, infrastructure, and agricultural research.
The World Bank’s policy reform lending strate -
gy produced different results in different borrowing
countries. In some countries it fell short because
very little durable policy reform was achieved
despite the large loans that were made. In other
countries it fell short because good policy changes
undertaken in some areas were counterbalanced
by damaging cutbacks in important state invest -
ments and public services. In Africa, the most con -
spicuous setbacks for policy reform lending were of
the first kind, where borrowing governments took
the money but then failed to undertake the pre -
scribed reforms. As noted above, a 1994 World
Bank review of 29 Sub-Saharan African countries
found significant backsliding on promised reforms
in the areas of monetary policy and agricultural
market deregulation (World Bank 1994). This same
pattern was revealed in a 2000 IFPRI study which
found that “for the most part, reforms were not fully
implemented… Many countries reversed reforms as
a result of external shocks or changing economic
conditions” (Kherallah et al. 2000, 9). A 2001
World Bank study of policy-conditioned foreign aid
conveys the same message. This study looks at bilat -
eral and multilateral assistance to 10 African coun -
tries (Ghana, Uganda, Ethiopia, Mali, Tanzania,
Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Zambia, Democratic Republic
of the Congo, Nigeria). In the end it could classi -
fy only the first two—Ghana and Uganda—as
“successful reformers.”
15 Another study, which
looks at Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe, concludes that in these states after
years of structural adjustment “the policy environ -
ment is not clearly more hospitable toward pri -
vate investment than it was before the liberaliza -
tion process began.”
16
The reluctance of African governments to persist
with liberal reforms prescribed by the World Bank
and other lenders or donors partly reflects a region -
al and historical culture of mistrust toward private
markets. It mirrors the public sector’s desire to con -
tinue managing food and farm commodity markets
and input-supply industries for narrow political
patronage (often bribe-seeking) purposes. Yet there
is also genuine concern that policy reforms request -
ed by the World Bank will—in the short run at
least—cause problems for the poor. Some basis for
this concern is seen in the difficult experiences of the
few African states that have worked hardest to
adhere to the World Bank’s structural adjustment
formulas. These countries often regained the sound
macroeconomic foundation needed to revive over -
all growth, but at a high price in terms of with -
drawing other kinds of public goods. Reforming
states are often under powerful pressure to continue
public investments and state services for favored
urban constituencies, so they are sometimes
inclined when cutting spending to disinvest in pro -
grams for the less visible, less powerful rural poor. 
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15  The study found that in Côte d’Ivoire and Ethiopia significant policy reforms were recently undertaken, but it is too soon to judge
their sustainability. In the other six countries, according to the study, “policies changed little or even got worse” (Devarajan, Dollar,
and Holmgren 2001, 1). The study remarks on the substantial quantities of foreign assistance spending that were made available
in Africa to “buy” policy reform ($3 billion went to Kenya alone for this purpose during 1970–96) with little actual policy change
to show in the end.
16  Jayne et al. (2001, 2) shows that Zimbabwe reimposed price controls in 1998, the government of Zambia got back into fertil -
izer distribution in 1997, Ethiopia curtailed marketing board operations but then permitted creation of regional holding compa -
nies, Kenya continued to intervene in its maize sector, and Malawi allowed its state-owned marketing board to continue operating
as the nation’s dominant maize buyer.In Ghana, the government began implementing
structural adjustment in cooperation with the IMF
and World Bank under an economic recovery
program in April 1983. Ghana took the adjustment
process seriously, and its subsequent macro-
economic performance emerged as a point of pride
for advocates of policy-based lending. Inflation
came under control and currency exchange rates
were successfully realigned, triggering a revival
of economic growth and exports, including cash-
crop farm exports. But at the same time Ghana
reduced important state investments in agriculture.
The real purchasing value of its total state expendi -
tures on agriculture declined from an index value
of 100 in 1981 to a low of 35.8 in 1984. Some
of the state outlays cut were wasteful subsidies for
inefficient state farming projects, but the index value
of real development expenditures on agriculture—
mainly capital investment outlays—also dropped
significantly, from 100 in 1981 to 60.7 in 1984.
Under the economic recovery program Ghana
did initiate a public investment program, which
included a number of infrastructure investments. But
the selection of projects for investment was based
on straight economic rates of return rather than
on numbers of people brought out of poverty or
hunger, so too much of this investment ended up
going to urban areas. Public investments in agr-
iculture under the program were only 13.6 per-
cent of the total, and public investments in educa -
tion and health together received only 6 percent
(Sarris and Shams 1991).
Sometimes nations undergoing structural adjust -
ment have fallen short in both policy reform and
public investment. Kenya, as noted, was prone to
repeated backsliding from its policy reform promis -
es in the 1980s, and its public-sector investments in
rural infrastructure slid at the same time. Between
1982 and 1988, Kenya’s spending on rural roads
declined by more than 40 percent. This was a time
of extreme budget stringency for the country
because of low coffee prices, but spending on
roads fell even as a percentage of government
expenditures, from 10.8 percent in 1980 to 3.0
percent by 1989 (Grindle 1996).
Responding to such frustrations in the late
1990s, the World Bank began moving toward a
semiofficial “new Washington consensus” that
looked beyond market-distorting policies to deeper
problems such as weak public goods provision
(Goldsmith 2001). The World Bank has been some -
what restricted from direct pursuit of better gover -
nance through conditioned lending, because as
noted earlier its mandate precludes it taking stands
for or against any particular type of political
regime. If the World Bank continues to encounter
frustration in Africa when lending for good policy,
and if it is indeed constrained from lending explicit -
ly for good government, then it might consider a
compromise option of returning to its earlier tradi -
tion of lending for good investments in some of the
more “policy proof” public goods areas that suf -
fered during the structural adjustment era, such as
rural infrastructure and agricultural research. A
return to this kind of investment-based lending
would help the World Bank again become a part of
the solution in Africa, rather than either seeming
irrelevant or (in some cases) as part of the problem. 
The agricultural sector is one area in which the
World Bank could resume larger investment lend -
ing. Between 1986 and 1993, total annual World
Bank lending for agriculture and rural development
fell from nearly $6 billion to only $4 billion (in con -
stant 1996 dollars). This decline then continued
through 1996, falling to just $2.7 billion (Paarlberg
1999). The World Bank went into the 1990s with
23 rural development projects in Sub-Saharan
Africa valued at $1.0 billion. By 1999 it was oper -
ating only eight such projects valued at just $224
million (Wolgin 2001). 
If the goal is to offset underinvestment by
African governments in rural public goods such as
transport, water, power, and agricultural research,
a move toward more investment lending by the
World Bank would seem to be in order. Using loans
to buy tangible public goods such as roads and
power can do more good for the rural poor than try -
ing to buy (or rent) some kinds or policy reform.
Such traditional public goods investments can also
reach indirectly into other areas of priority concern,
such as gender equity. In rural Africa it will be
women as farmers and as family caregivers who
benefit first from improved feeder roads, stronger
marketing infrastructure, better access to health
45services, clean water and electricity, and new
breakthroughs in publicly funded agricultural
research. Supplemented by programs specifically
targeted at women—including child and maternal
health clinics, women’s microcredit lending pro -
grams, greater support for women’s participation in
research and extension, and membership in rural
cooperatives—basic investments in rural public
goods in Africa may be one of the best ways to pur -
sue greater gender equity (FAO 1997).
46When national governments fail to deliver the pub -
lic goods essential for domestic food security, can
NGOs or INGOs step in to fill the gap? Naturally
many have tried to do so. Scholars debate whether
this has been a spontaneous civil society response
to government failures in the developing world
(Brown and Korten 1991) or a phenomenon guided
and sponsored by governments within the donor
community (Tvedt 1998). Consistent with the sec -
ond view, NGOs can offer donor governments a
convenient alternative channel for providing some
kinds of assistance, plus valuable political support
to the aid bureaucracies of donor governments,
once the NGOs become dependent on public fi-
nancing. NGO activities are convenient to national
governments in the developing world too, as gov -
ernments under budget pressure welcome an alter -
native means for delivering some of the social serv -
ices that the state no longer can supply. 
The private organizations that seem to work
best in developing countries in filling gaps in social
service delivery are local grassroots people’s asso -
ciations, those that live as well as work among the
rural poor. While such organizations are widely
appreciated in the abstract by donors and larger
NGOs, they nonetheless tend to be overlooked for
funding and often remain disconnected from larger
national and international NGO networks. This is
partly because so many are rural rather than urban
(and hence hard to reach). It also reflects their lack
of the administrative capabilities that most donor
bureaucracies demand, such as professional leader -
ship, a formal mission statement, and the ability to
produce—often in English or some other European
language—a regular stream of accounting reports,
project information, and grant proposals.
Even without donor funding, these local rural
groups have often been capable of stepping in to
fill at least some of the gaps left by public-sector
governance failures. They usually do best where
local collective self-help activities can substitute for
the delivery of government services. For example,
they may play a valuable role in local infrastruc-
ture maintenance and protection of natural re-
sources, helping to maintain walking paths or water-
harvesting tanks, or protecting trees, grazing lands,
ponds, and riverbanks. Traditional village-level
organizations often do a better job than the modern
state in managing such local common-property
resource systems (Jodha 1991). Irrigation manage -
ment is another function that is often better per -
formed by local associations than by the centralized
organs of the state (Uphoff 1996).
There is a limit, however, to what local grass -
roots organizations can provide. While they can
manage natural resources or maintain and manage
some infrastructure systems already in place, they
usually lack the financial clout or the wide reach
needed to create new and broadly connected rural
infrastructure systems. Local groups can manage
water-sharing and field channel maintenance once
an irrigation scheme is created, but they do not
ordinarily have the resources to construct such a
scheme from scratch. While they can help manage
the maintenance and repair of local rural road sys -
tems, they do not ordinarily have the resources to
build modern paved all-weather roads. Or at best
they can provide the labor needed to build some
kinds of rural roads, but not the wages needed to
pay the laborers. 
National NGOs tend to have a wider reach
and more abundant resources than their local grass -
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7.  The Role of NGOs in Supplying 
Missing Public Goodsroots counterparts. They typically work from a cen -
tral office in the capital city, enjoy access to key min -
istries, stay connected nationally and internation-
ally using modern communications capabilities,
and often have their own small fleet of vehicles suit -
able for trips upcountry. These assets give them
credibility in the eyes of international donors and
the INGO community, often their most important
sources of funding. National NGOs might thus
seem better positioned to make up for national gov -
ernance deficits, such as providing investments or
services that governments fail to supply. In fact,
national NGOs can play this role in a wide range
of areas—certainly including delivery of child and
maternal health services, family planning services,
emergency relief, school-based feeding programs,
child inoculation and oral rehydration programs,
and microcredit schemes. Microcredit lending proj -
ects, moreover, can contribute directly to food secu -
rity, since 60 percent of such funds typically goes to
the rural poor (often women) to support agriculture.
NGOs have these significant capabilities, and in
some emergency cases where the authority of a
central government has collapsed entirely due to
ethnopolitical conflict (for example, in southern
Sudan), virtually all public services have had to be
turned over to them. 
Yet even in these extreme cases, the goods that
NGOs deliver are usually private services to indi -
viduals rather than genuine public goods invest -
ments. NGOs are good at reaching individual com -
munities with valuable services, but they are not as
good at, for example, creating regional water,
power, or rural road systems or sustaining agricul -
tural research programs. Also, many NGOs as cur -
rently constituted fall prey to some of the same limi -
tations found within developing-country govern -
ments. Just as national governments in many poor
developing countries tend to be urban-biased, over -
ly centralized, and not directly accountable to rural
communities, so too do many NGOs. When head -
quartered in the capital city, NGOs may be just as
prone to domination by urban-dwelling elites. In
terms of organizational structure, many national
NGOs are just as centralized and top-down as gov -
ernments, having adopted this organizational style
partly to carry out the standardized reporting and
financial accounting demanded by donors. As a
consequence, some NGOs working on rural devel -
opment projects in Africa have begun to slip into
the same trap of excessive centralization and expa -
triate management that previously characterized
public-sector projects in rural areas (Cleaver 1997).
NGOs usually want to be accountable to local com -
munities and work in genuine partnership with local
grassroots organizations. But they must also be
accountable to the foreign donors that provide them
with funds and to the national governments that
grant them political space to operate. Sudden
budget constraints imposed by donors or sudden
shifts in policy by national governments can force
NGOs to unilaterally abandon projects in local
communities (Tvedt 1998).
NGOs also face limits in democracy promo -
tion. Donors like to assist local NGO “society
organizations” that engage in prodemocracy
actions such as voter education and election moni -
toring, advocacy for government transparency, or
support of political and civil rights more broadly.
The attraction of such prodemocracy NGOs is the
fact that they are not political parties engaged in
explicit competition for political office, so donors
can support them without being accused of working
for or against any one particular local partisan fac -
tion. Yet the disadvantage of these NGOs is, once
again, their tendency to operate somewhat apart
from civil society. They are seldom closely linked
with local grassroots organizations or with the most
important local social movements or voluntary asso -
ciations such as religious associations, social net -
works, and sports clubs. They tend to be urban-
based and urban-biased and depend so heavily
on donor support that they risk appearing foreign-
sponsored and hence inauthentic (Ottaway 2000).
In food security and agriculture, NGOs work
best when they are partnering with governments
rather than trying to replace or challenge them. If
governments want to pursue rural infrastructure
investments, NGOs can help to mobilize the es-
sential local participation in both planning and
construction of, say, rural road, water, and power
projects. Local participation is usually the key to
ensuring affordable maintenance and successful
management via a greater sense of local ownership.
48NGO participation can also help governments tar -
get public infrastructure investments effectively toward
the poor. But the resources themselves usually have
to come through the public sector.
In agricultural research, NGOs are valuable
once again for bringing a participatory dimension
into the development of new farming technologies,
and they often play a key role in the transfer of new
technologies from research institutes into farmer’s
fields. But NGOs in poor countries will seldom be
equipped to provide the laboratory, greenhouse,
and field station work so often necessary to devel -
op effective farming technologies. In some coun -
tries, where funding within national research sys -
tems has declined, NGOs have sought to hire the
scientists leaving the public sector, but once they
are separated from their laboratory facilities, these
scientists are often reduced to much less produc-
tive kinds of research. To solve this problem, there
can be no substitute for improved funding through
the public sector. 
In sum, asking NGOs to provide essential pub -
lic goods where national governments have failed
to do so is usually asking too much. NGOs are
good at many things, but they have not yet demon -
strated an ability to keep or restore the peace in
divided societies, and they are unable to push gov -
ernments to embrace democracy or to make the
research and infrastructure investments needed to
supply the rural poor with better transport, power,
water, or technology options. NGOs can help with
all of these tasks if governments are doing their job.
But when national governments fail or abdicate,
NGOs can compensate only to a limited degree.
Recall that in the most successful East Asian devel -
oping countries, where hunger has been reduced
most rapidly, the essential public goods have almost
always been provided by governments, not NGOs. 
49We began by asking how the challenge of provid -
ing improved nutrition and food security for all has
been altered by globalization. We end with a con -
clusion that the forces of globalization have not nec -
essarily shifted responsibility for ending hunger
away from traditional governance institutions such
as nation-states. National governments in many
regions of the developing world (particularly East
and Southeast Asia) have managed, despite glob -
alization, to act effectively to reduce the hunger and
malnutrition problems facing so many of their citi -
zens. They did this by establishing and maintaining
internal peace, by providing rule of law, and by
making the public investments in rural infrastruc-
ture and agricultural research needed to sup-
port farm productivity growth and facilitate rural
poverty reduction. Providing such public goods
is easier in some regions than in others, due to
different colonial and demographic histories plus
differing agroclimatic endowments. Yet in states
where these minimal public goods are not yet pro -
vided by government—particularly in Sub-Saharan
Africa—violent conflicts and property insecurity
have undermined investment and growth, and lag -
ging farm productivity has deepened rural poverty
and worsened hunger.
These divergent food security outcomes in dif -
ferent developing-country regions remind us that the
world’s food system is not really a single global sys -
tem after all. The most important forces producing
persistent hunger today tend to be local or national
rather than global, and they are still governed best
at the local or national level rather than at the glob -
al level. Where national governments have
responded well to this challenge, hunger has come
under better control. Where national governments
have not yet responded appropriately, hunger has
persisted or even worsened. 
Hunger persists in nations and regions suffering
from inadequate national governance despite the
recent emergence in some areas of more effective
“global governance” for food-security. In areas such
as international food trade, international food aid,
famine early warning and relief, and international
agricultural research, an impressive set of inter-
national governance institutions capable of provid -
ing significant global public goods has already
been created and continues to evolve. These institu -
tions should be improved and certainly be better
funded by national governments, but governance
deficits at the global level are neither the first nor the
most obvious cause of persistent hunger in some
regions of the developing world. It is an underpro -
vision of public goods at the national level, not the
global level, that remains our central food-security
governance problem.
Improving the public goods delivery perform -
ance of governments within the developing world is
a difficult job for outsiders to assume, given the pow -
erful norms of nation-state sovereignty and noninter -
vention. Still, those genuinely interested in improving
governance in developing regions such as Africa
have a number of practical options to follow.
First, they can do a better job of helping with
internal peace preservation and peace restoration,
by strengthening the capacity of legitimate inter -
governmental institutions (such as the U.N. Security
Council and secretary-general) to intervene in con -
flicts or in preconflict situations with timely diplo -
matic initiatives or sufficient military force.
Second, they can do a better job from the out -
side of promoting rule of law and democratic gov -
ernance through a disciplined use of the political
and diplomatic influence at their disposal so as to
isolate leaders unwilling to hold competitive elec -
tions or govern in an accountable fashion. 
8.  Conclusion—Assigning Responsibilities
50Third, and perhaps most important, they can be
far more generous in the way they provide interna -
tional economic and financial assistance. Instead of
cutting back on international assistance to agricul -
ture at a time when hunger is a growing problem in
some regions, they can increase that assistance.
The political credibility of all other external efforts
and criticisms will be undercut if the funding that
donors provide continues to decline. 
Finally, instead of linking so much aid and lend -
ing to the abstract pursuit of “policy reform,” the
donor community should rediscover the value of
financing tangible investments in rural infrastructure
and research. 
Outsiders concerned about hunger have little
room to complain about the weak performance of
national governments in the developing world as
long as they fail to shoulder these important respon -
sibilities. Among those who accept these responsi -
bilities, however, there should be no reason to
refrain from criticizing governance failures within the
developing world. In too many international devel -
opment settings a code of silence prevails regarding
governance failures in poor countries. This culture of
noncriticism is useful to support the harmonious con -
duct of international meetings, but it does little to
advance the interests of the poor and hungry. If the
donor community, out of a misplaced sense of polite -
ness, fails to critique the substandard performance
of developing-country leaders in policy areas such
as public goods provision, the poor are not be-
ing helped. Outsiders are obligated to speak and
act when national governments persistently fail to
advance the interests of their own people.
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